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Abstract
The establishment of a single European day-ahead market has accomplished the integration of the
regional day-ahead markets. However, the reserves provision and activation remain an exclusive
responsibility of regional operators. This limited spatial coordination and the sequential market
structure hinder the efficient utilization of flexible generation and transmission, since their capac-
ities have to be ex-ante allocated between energy and reserves. To promote reserve exchange,
recent work has proposed a preemptive model that defines the optimal inter-area transmission
capacities for energy and reserves reducing the expected system cost. This decision-support tool,
formulated as a stochastic bilevel program, respects the current architecture but does not suggest
area-specific costs that guarantee sufficient incentives for all areas to accept the solution. To this
end, we formulate a preemptive model in a framework that allows the application of coalitional
game theory methods to obtain a stable benefit allocation, i.e., an outcome immune to coalitional
deviations ensuring willingness of all areas to coordinate. We show that benefit allocation mech-
anisms can be formulated either at the day-ahead or the real-time stages, in order to distribute
the expected or the scenario-specific benefits, respectively. For both games, the proposed benefits
achieve minimal stability violation, while allowing for a tractable computation with limited queries
to the bilevel program. Our case studies, based on an illustrative and a more realistic test case,
compare our method with well-studied benefit allocations, namely, the Shapley value and the nu-
cleolus. We show that our method performs better in stability, tractability, and fairness, which
would potentially be dictated by a criterion chosen by the regulator.
Keywords: OR in energy, coalitional game theory, stochastic programming, bilevel
programming, electricity markets
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1. Introduction
The existing market architectures and the predominant models for system balancing were de-
signed in a time when fully controllable generators with nonnegligible marginal costs were prevalent.
However, as the increasing shares of variable and partly predictable renewables displace control-
lable generation the dispatch flexibility decreases, while the operational uncertainty characteristics
become increasingly complex (Denholm & Hand, 2011). In light of this new operational paradigm,
there is an imperative need to re-evaluate the current market design, and there has been a surge
of interest in proposing new market frameworks (Neuhoff, 2005; Ahlstrom et al., 2015).
According to the European electricity market design, the bulk volume of energy trading takes
place in the day-ahead market, which is typically cleared 12-36 hours before the actual delivery,
based on single-valued point forecasts of the stochastic power output of renewables. In turn, a
balancing market is cleared close to real-time operation in order to compensate any deviations from
the day-ahead schedule. Apart from these energy-only trading floors, a reserve capacity auction
is organized, usually prior to the day-ahead market, in order to ensure that sufficient capacity is
set aside for the provision of balancing services. Following this sequential clearing approach, the
current market structure attains only limited coordination between day-ahead and balancing stages.
Aiming to enhance this temporal coupling, recently proposed dispatch models employ stochastic
programming, which allows for a probabilistic description of renewables’ forecast errors, in order to
co-optimize the day-ahead and the reserve capacity markets (Pritchard et al., 2010; Morales et al.,
2012). However, these approaches cannot be directly applied to the European electricity market,
since they would require significant restructuring of the current market framework.
In terms of geographical considerations, the European electricity market is fully coordinated
only at the day-ahead stage, while reserve capacity and balancing markets are still operated on
a regional level (Gebrekiros, 2015). However, the European Commission (EC) regulation has al-
ready established a detailed guideline framework (EC, 2017) that lays out the rules also for the
integration of the European balancing markets in order to improve the security of supply and the
efficiency of the balancing system. In this ongoing process that is expected to be completed by
2023 (ENTSO-E, 2018a), several questions remain open regarding the specific structure and final
coordination arrangement among the various ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission Sys-
tem Operators for Electricity) member countries, since there is no binding legislation that enforces
transmission system operators (TSOs) to enter such collaborations. The recent study in (EC,
2016) to investigate the costs and the benefits of different organizational models for the integration
of balancing markets, shows that the 10-year net present value (NPV) of coordinated balancing
ranges from 1,7 to 3,8 Be, depending on the degree of coordination in the inter-area exchanges.
Nonetheless, any coordination arrangement in the procurement and activation of reserves depends
upon the availability of inter-regional transmission capacity. Given that the energy and reserve ca-
pacity markets are cleared sequentially, the cross-border transmission resources have to be ex-ante
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allocated between energy and reserves. However, the exact methodology for allocating inter-area
transmission capacity remains in consultation with ENTSO-E members (ENTSO-E, 2018b). To
this end, the goal of this paper is to propose an approach for the design of a transmission allocation
mechanism that attains high efficiency both from a technical and an economic perspective.
The reservation of inter-area interconnections for reserve exchange withdraws transmission re-
sources from the day-ahead market, where the main volume of electricity is being traded. Hence, a
sub-optimal reservation may lead to significant efficiency losses at the day-ahead stage. To prevent
this situation, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) (2012) mandates to
perform detailed analyses demonstrating that such reservation would increase overall social welfare.
Up to this date, inter-area transmission capacity is typically allocated entirely to day-ahead energy
exchanges. One notable exemption is the Skagerrak interconnector between Western Denmark and
Norway, in which 15% of the capacity is permanently set aside for reserve exchange (Energinet.dk,
2010). Nevertheless, this allocation is static, while the true optimum varies dynamically depending
on generation, load, and system uncertainties. As such, Delikaraoglou & Pinson (2018) developed a
preemptive transmission allocation model that defines the optimal inter-area transmission capacity
allocation to improve both spatial and temporal coordination at the reserve procurement stage.
The recently proposed preemptive transmission allocation model focuses on the minimization
of the expected system cost, assuming implicitly full coordination among the regional operators.
This assumption is in line with the current state of the day-ahead market, which is fully inte-
grated across Europe, or even for the balancing markets in certain regions, e.g., in the Nordic
system all reserve activation offers are pooled into a common merit-order list and are available
to all TSOs (Bondy et al., 2014). However, the initial version of the preemptive model does not
suggest an area-specific cost allocation which guarantees that all areas have sufficient incentives
to accept the proposed solution. To address this issue, we integrate the preemptive model in a
mathematical framework that allows the application of tools from coalitional game theory in order
to obtain a stable benefit allocation, i.e., an outcome immune to coalitional deviations ensuring
that all areas are willing to coordinate via the preemptive model. The concepts and the tools from
coalitional game theory have recently been widely used in the energy community. The Shapley
value has been employed in similar problems regarding the distribution of social welfare among
TSOs participating in an imbalance netting cooperation (Avramiotis-Falireas et al., 2018) as well
as the benefit allocation in transmission network expansion problems (Ruiz & Contreras, 2007)
and in cross-border interconnection development in the North Sea offshore grid (Kristiansen et al.,
2018). However, the Shapley value is in general not within the core, i.e., the set of stable outcomes.
Baeyens et al. (2013) shared the expected profits from aggregating wind power generation using
the core benefit allocations, whereas a similar concept was applied for prosumer cooperation in a
combined heat and electricity system in (Mitridati et al., 2019), and for cross-border transmission
expansion in the Northeast Asia in (Churkin et al., 2019).
In contrast to the case studies in the aforementioned works, realistic instances of our prob-
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lem can potentially exhibit an empty core. To this end, we utilize the least-core as a solution
concept, since it achieves minimal stability violation, i.e., minimal incentives for coalitional devi-
ations (Maschler et al., 1979). To obtain a unique outcome, we propose the approximation of a
fairness criterion, which is at the discretion of the regulatory authorities to define. We propose two
variations of the benefit allocation mechanism that can be executed either at the day-ahead or the
real-time stage to distribute the expected or the actual benefits (i.e., when the uncertainty is re-
vealed), respectively. We illustrate how these two formulations establish a trade-off between allocat-
ing the risk to the regulator or to the regional operators. To overcome the exhaustive enumeration
of all coalitional deviations, we show that the least-core selecting benefit allocations in this work
can be computed efficiently via an iterative constraint generation algorithm. Similar algorithms
were utilized to compute an outcome from the core in combinatorial auctions (Day & Raghavan,
2007), inventory games (Drechsel & Kimms, 2010) and electricity markets (Karaca et al., 2019b). In
contrast, our algorithm treats the least-core and it is formulated for a general nonconvex problem.
Our contributions are as follows. We formulate the coalition-dependent version of the preemp-
tive transmission allocation model to consider coalitional deviations. We then study the coalitional
game that treats the benefits as an ex-ante process with respect to the uncertainty realization and
we provide a condition under which the core is nonempty. In case this condition is not found,
we show that the least-core, which attains minimal stability violation, also ensures the individual
rationality property. We then propose the least-core selecting mechanism as a benefit allocation
that achieves minimal stability violation, while enabling the approximation of an additional fair-
ness criterion. In order to implement this mechanism with only a few queries to the preemptive
model, we formulate a constraint generation algorithm. In addition, we formulate a variation of
the coalitional game that allocates the benefits in an ex-post process, which can be applied only
after the uncertainty realization is known. For this game, we provide conditions under which the
core is empty and we propose an ex-post version of our benefit allocation mechanism. The ex-
ante and ex-post versions of this mechanism can achieve the same fundamental properties for the
regional operators either for every uncertainty realization or in expectation, respectively. Finally,
our results are verified first with an illustrative three-area nine-node system and then with a more
realistic case study based on a larger IEEE test system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the organizational
structure of electricity markets and introduces a set of necessary assumptions to obtain tractable
models. Section 3 discusses the issues related to reserve exchanges and different coordination
arrangements for transmission allocations and motivates the formulation of the preemptive trans-
mission allocation model. Section 4 introduces some necessary background from coalitional game
theory, whereas Section 5 focuses on the coalitional games arising from the preemptive model,
which provide the basis for the design of the benefit allocation mechanisms that accomplish the
implicit coordination requirements outlined in the previous section. The numerical case studies are
presented in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes the paper and gives suggestions for future work.
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2. Electricity market framework
2.1. Sequential electricity market design and modeling assumptions
The existing market design based on the sequential and independent clearing of reserves, day-
ahead, and balancing markets suffers from two main caveats that become increasingly pronounced
as we move towards larger shares of renewable energy production. On the one hand, the day-ahead
schedule is optimized based on purely deterministic inputs, i.e., single-valued forecasts of renewable
production. As a result, the day-ahead market is not responsive to the uncertainty associated with
the forecast errors of stochastic renewables and thus it is weakly coordinated with the real-time
balancing actions. On the other hand, the decoupling of energy and upward/downward reserve
capacity trading into two independent auctions ignores the substitution and complementary prop-
erties of these two services and leads to inefficient reserve procurement and energy schedules. In
order to enable the inter-area exchange of reserves given this decoupling of reserve and energy mar-
kets, the operator has to prescribe a certain share of the interconnection capacities to the reserve
capacity market and in turn withdraw this headroom from the day-ahead energy trading.
From a theoretical perspective, these two issues can be contained if reserve capacity procure-
ment, day-ahead energy schedules, and real-time re-dispatch actions are jointly optimized based
on a probabilistic description of the uncertainty. As several recent works show, e.g., Bouffard et al.
(2005), Pritchard et al. (2010), and Morales et al. (2012) among others, the co-optimization of
these services using a stochastic programming framework reduces the total expected system cost
and it establishes a benchmark in terms of perfect temporal coordination. However, the adoption
of a stochastic dispatch model as a market-clearing algorithm requires significant restructuring of
the current European market framework that electricity sector stakeholders may not be willing to
embrace. Owing to this reason, we restrict ourselves to the status-quo market architecture and we
embody its design attributes in our methodology aiming to mitigate the resulting inefficiencies.
In the following, we build the mathematical models of the different trading floors based on a
set of realistic assumptions that allows us to capture the main attributes of the European market,
while maintaining computational tractability. In line with the current practice, we consider a zonal
network representation during the reserve procurement, whereas the full network topology is taken
into account in the day-ahead and the balancing market-clearing models, using a DC power flow
approximation. Note that our network model can be readily adapted to a zonal pricing scheme,
where the inter-zonal transmission energy flows are constrained by the available transfer capacity,
following the internal electricity market paradigm. However, since this work focuses on transmission
allocation issues concerning primarily the operators, we believe that allowing for a more complete
network representation will increase the value of the proposed models as decision-support tools.
On the generation side, we consider that all market participants are perfectly competitive. Day-
ahead energy offers are submitted in price-quantity pairs that internalize the marginal production
cost as well as the unit commitment and inter-temporal constraints, e.g. ramping limits, in accor-
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dance with the portfolio bidding practice in the European market. Moreover, we assume that the
reserve capacity offer prices provide adequate incentives to the flexible generators for the provision
of real-time balancing services, i.e., no price premiums are required in balancing to compensate for
the opportunity cost of the capacity withdrawn from the day-ahead market. In terms of stochastic
renewable in-feed, we focus on wind power generation and we model forecast errors using a finite
set of scenarios. Assuming null production costs, the corresponding offer price and the spillage cost
are set equal to zero. On the consumption side, we consider inelastic demand with a large penalty
on lost load and thus the social welfare maximization becomes equivalent to the cost minimization.
Finally, we assume that the current implementation of the sequential market provides a budget
balanced method to allocate the system cost to all the areas, i.e. the costs of the reserve capacity
market, the day-ahead market and the balancing market are allocated to the areas without any
deficit or surplus. In the numerics, for the case of no inter-area exchange of reserves, we provide and
discuss one such allocation method based on the zonal and nodal prices that assigns producer and
consumer surpluses to their corresponding areas, and divides the congestion rent equally between
the adjacent areas, see (Kristiansen et al., 2018) and Section 6.1.
2.2. Mathematical formulation
For the models below, main notation is stated in Appendix A.
2.2.1. Reserve capacity market
Having as a fixed input the upward/downward reserve requirements RR+a /RR
−
a in each area a
and a pre-defined share χe of the transmission capacity of each inter-area link e allocated to reserves
exchange, the reserve capacity market clearing is formulated as:
minimize
ΦR
∑
i∈I
(
C+i r
+
i + C
−
i r
−
i
)
(1a)
subject to
∑
i∈MIa
r+i +
∑
e∈E
H(e, a)r+e ≥ RR+a , ∀a ∈ A, (1b)∑
i∈MIa
r−i +
∑
e∈E
H(e, a)r−e ≥ RR−a , ∀a ∈ A, (1c)
0 ≤ r+i ≤ R+i , ∀i ∈ I, 0 ≤ r−i ≤ R−i , ∀i ∈ I, (1d)
− χeTe ≤ r+e ≤ χeTe, ∀e ∈ E , −χeTe ≤ r−e ≤ χeTe, ∀e ∈ E , (1e)
where ΦR = {r+i , r−i ,∀i; r+e , r−e ,∀e} is the set of optimization variables. The objective function (1a)
to be minimized is the cost of reserve procurement. Constraints (1b) and (1c) ensure, respectively,
that the upward and downward reserve requirements of each area are satisfied either by procuring
reserve capacity from intra-area generators or via inter-area reserves exchange that is modelled
using the incidence matrix H(e, a). As shown in Appendix A, for each link e with sending and
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receiving ends in areas as(e) and ar(e), respectively, H(e, a) is equal to 1 (-1) if reserve import
(export) is considered from (to) area a = as(e) (a = ar(e)) and zero for any other area. With this
definition availability of cross-border reserves within the neighboring areas is guaranteed by (1b)
and (1c). We underline that directed links are used as a notational convention, and both r+e and r
−
e
are free of sign. Upward and downward capacity offers of dispatchable power plants are enforced
by constraints (1d). The set of constraints (1e) models the bounds on reserves exchange between
two areas across link e. Following the current practice, we consider a zonal network representation
for the reserve capacity markets and thus the transmission capacity Te of link e is defined as the
aggregated flow limit of all tie-lines ` ∈ Λe across link e calculated as Te =
∑
`∈Λe T`, for all e ∈ E .
Setting the transmission capacity allocation χe to any value different than zero, establishes
practically a reserve exchange mechanism between the areas located at the two ends of the link
and consequently it enables the exchange of balancing services during real-time operation. On the
contrary, setting χe = 0 implies that there would be no reserve exchange at the procurement stage,
i.e., the cross-border transmission capacity is fully allocated to day-ahead energy exchanges. In
that case, we also prevent the exchange of balancing services and the imbalance netting between
the adjacent areas, as we will formally describe in the balancing market model formulation below.
2.2.2. Day-ahead market
Given the optimal reserve procurement ΦˆR = {rˆ+i , rˆ−i ,∀i; rˆ+e , rˆ−e , ∀e}, the day-ahead schedule
is the solution to the following optimization problem:
minimize
ΦD
∑
i∈I
Cipi (2a)
subject to
∑
j∈MJn
wj +
∑
i∈MIn
pi −
∑
`∈LAC
A`nf` = Dn, ∀n ∈ N , (2b)
rˆ−i ≤ pi ≤ Pi − rˆ+i , ∀i ∈ I, (2c)
0 ≤ wj ≤W j , ∀j ∈ J , (2d)
f` = B`
∑
n∈N
A`nδn, ∀` ∈ LAC, (2e)
− (1− χ`) T` ≤ f` ≤ (1− χ`) T`, ∀` ∈ LAC, (2f)
δ1 = 0, δn free, ∀n ∈ N , (2g)
where ΦD = {pi,∀i;wj ,∀j; δn, ∀n; f`, ∀`} is the set of optimization variables. We define χ` = χe
for all tie-lines ` ∈ Λe and χ` = 0 for all intra-area lines. For the remainder, we strictly follow this
notation. The objective function (2a) to be minimized is the day-ahead cost of energy production.
Constraints (2b) enforce the day-ahead power balance for each node. The upper and lower pro-
duction limits of dispatchable power plants are enforced by (2c), taking into account the reserve
schedule from the previous trading floor. Constraints (2d) limit the stochastic production to a point
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forecast, typically the expected value of the stochastic process. Power flows are computed in (2e)
and then restricted by the capacity limits in (2f) considering that only (1−χ`) percent of the capac-
ity is available for day-ahead energy trade. The voltage angle at node 1 is fixed to zero in (2g) setting
this as the reference node, whereas the remaining voltage angles are declared as free variables.
2.2.3. Balancing market
Being close to real-time operation uncertainty realization s′ and actual wind power production
Wjs′ , ∀j ∈ J are known. Any energy deviations from the optimal day-ahead schedule ΦˆD = {pˆi,∀i;
wˆj , ∀j; δˆn, ∀n; fˆ`, ∀`} must be contained using proper re-dispatch actions that respect the reserve
procurement schedule ΦˆR. To determine the re-dispatch actions that minimize the balancing cost,
the balancing market is cleared based on the following optimization problem:
minimize
Φs
′
B
∑
i∈I
Ci
(
p+is′ − p−is′
)
+
∑
n∈N
Cshlshns′ (3a)
subject to
∑
i∈MIn
(
p+is′−p−is′
)
+lshns′+
∑
j∈MJn
(
Wjs′−wˆj−wspilljs′
)
+
∑
`∈LAC
A`n
(
fˆ`−f`s′
)
=0, ∀n∈N , (3b)
0≤p+is′≤rˆ+i , ∀i∈I, 0≤p−is′≤rˆ−i , ∀i∈I, (3c)
0≤lshns′≤Dn, ∀n∈N , 0≤wspilljs′ ≤Wjs′ , ∀j∈J , (3d)
f`s′=B`
∑
n∈N
A`nδns′ , ∀`∈LAC, (3e)
−T`≤f`s′≤T`, ∀`∈LAC, (3f)
f`s′=fˆ`, ∀`∈∪e∈E−(χ)Λe, (3g)
δ1s′=0, δns′ free, ∀n∈N , (3h)
where Φs
′
B = {p+is′ , p−is′ , ∀i;wspilljs′ ,∀j; lshns′ , δns′ , ∀n; f`s′ , ∀`} is the set of optimization variables.
The objective function (3a) is the cost of re-dispatch actions, i.e., reserve activation and load
shedding. Up and down re-dispatches have the same prices since we previously assumed that no
price premiums are required in the balancing stage to compensate for the opportunity cost of
withdrawing capacity from the day-ahead stage, see Section 2.1. Equality constraints (3b) ensure
that all the nodes remain in balance after the re-dispatch of generation and any necessary wind
power curtailment or load shedding. Constraints (3c) ensure that upward and downward reserve
deployment respects the corresponding procured quantities. The upper bounds on load shedding
and power spillage are set equal to the nodal demand and the realized wind power production by
constraints (3d). Real-time power flows are modeled by (3e) and then restricted by the transmis-
sion capacity limits in (3f). Constraints (3g), where E−(χ) = {e ∈ E|χe = 0} denotes the set of
inter-area links with no existing cross-border agreement across them, ensure that if χe = 0, the
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real-time flows on the tie lines are fixed to their day-ahead values. This follows from the previ-
ous assumption that prevents any reserve sharing or imbalance netting during real-time operation
across link e if χe = 0. Similarly to the day-ahead formulation, node 1 is set as the reference node
in (3h) and the remaining voltage angles are declared as free variables.
3. Transmission capacity allocations for cross-border balancing
3.1. Coordination schemes and transmission allocation arrangements for cross-border trading
The transition to an integrated balancing market requires several organizational changes to the
prevailing operational model, in which reserves are procured and deployed on an intra-area basis. A
prerequisite for the establishment of a well-functioning balancing framework is the standardization
of the rules and products as well as the definition of transparent mechanisms that will facilitate the
cooperation among the TSOs (Hobbs et al., 2005). Below, we outline the main coordination schemes
and transmission allocation arrangements as defined in the current European regulation (EC, 2017).
Inter-area reserve procurement can be organized as a reserve exchange scheme and/or as a
reserve sharing agreement. Implementing the former scheme, regional TSOs can procure balancing
capacity resources located in adjacent areas in order to meet their own area reserve requirements.
Since the reserve requirements of each area remain unchanged, this coordination setup requires
limited organizational changes, as it basically reallocates the reserve quantities towards areas with
lower procurement costs. To improve also the dimensioning efficiency of the procurement process,
a reserve sharing agreement allows a TSO to use available reserve capacity from adjacent TSOs.
An implied prerequisite for this arrangement would be that the definition of regional reserve re-
quirements is performed jointly by all TSOs that participate in the sharing agreement.
In terms of coordination during reserves activation, the main organizational setups are the
so-called imbalance netting and exchange of balancing energy. The first setup pertains to the
inter-area exchange of imbalances with opposite sign, thus preventing the counteracting activation
of balancing resources and reducing the total balancing energy volumes. In turn, the exchange of
balancing energy enables the system-wide least-cost activation of reserves through a common merit-
order list to meet the net imbalance of the joint TSO area. This improves the supply efficiency of
balancing energy, at the expense of more extensive coordination requirements.
The establishment of any cross-border reserve procurement scheme requires the reservation of
a certain share of the inter-area transmission capacity for the reserves and their activation. Before
we describe the attributes of any specific transmission allocation mechanism, let us provide an
illustrative example. This example highlights the seams issues pertaining to the ex-ante definition
of transmission allocation between neighboring areas. Figure 1 shows the expected system cost,
i.e., the sum of reserve procurement, day-ahead energy and expected balancing costs, as a function
of the share of transmission capacity χ that is allocated to inter-area reserves trading. The data
for this two-area power system is provided in Appendix B. Even from this simple example, it
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becomes apparent that there generally exists an optimal allocation to be made, which however
may dynamically vary depending on generation, load and system uncertainties. Therefore, the
efficiency of an integrated balancing market, in terms of expected system cost, is highly susceptible
to the parameter χ. This in turn asks for a systematic method to optimally define χ, accounting
for the market dynamics and the uncertainty involved in the operation of the power system.
a1
a2
χ
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
75%
87.5%
100%312 MW
273 MW
234 MW
Figure 1: Expected operation cost (in e) as a function of transmission capacity allocated to inter-area reserves
trading under different levels of wind power penetration (in MW).
In this work, we focus on the prevailing market-based mechanism for the allocation of cross-
border transmission capacity between energy and reserves. According to this methodology, a share
of inter-area transmission capacity is set aside for reserves based on the comparison of the market
value of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of balancing capacity or sharing of reserves and
the market value of cross-zonal capacity for the exchange of energy. This methodology provides
a reasonable trade-off between allocation efficiency and practical applicability within the current
framework, albeit it still incurs the inherent drawbacks of the sequential market structure regarding
the deterministic view of uncertainty and the separation of energy and reserve services. We refer the
interested reader to (EC, 2017) for discussions on alternative transmission allocation mechanisms.
3.2. Preemptive transmission allocation model
In this section, we first describe the preemptive transmission allocation model that was initially
proposed in (Delikaraoglou & Pinson, 2018) and is the key building block of the benefit alloca-
tion mechanisms proposed in this work. This work, however, defines the preemptive model in a
more general framework, which allows us to consider coalitional deviations and in turn define the
necessary incentives that support the solution proposed by the preemptive model.
The preemptive transmission allocation model can be perceived as a decision-support tool
for the system operators, which aims at defining the optimal shares of transmission capacity for
inter-area trading of energy and reserves. Being fully aligned with the existing sequential market
structure, the preemptive model is essentially a market-based allocation process that is performed
prior to the reserve capacity and day-ahead energy markets to find the optimal transmission alloca-
tions {χˆe,∀e} that minimize the expected system cost, see Figure 2. It is worth mentioning that the
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coordinated reserve exchange would require a transfer of some responsibilities to European bodies,
even though some TSOs might be hesitant to assign some of their autonomy to a central authority.
Preemptive model
Problem (4)
Res. cap. market
Problem (1) Day-ahead market
Problem (2)
Balancing market
Problem (3)
for scenario s′
{χˆe,∀e}
(
rˆ+i ,rˆ
−
i ,
rˆ+e ,rˆ
−
e
) (
pˆi,wˆj ,
δˆn,fˆ`
)
{1− χˆe,∀e}
(
rˆ+i ,rˆ
−
i ,
rˆ+e ,rˆ
−
e
)
C ⊆ A
Figure 2: Schematic representation of preemptive transmission allocation model
In this work, the primary focus is on the establishment of coalitional agreements for the reserve
procurement stage among a set of areas C ⊆ A. In the balancing market, we assume that all
areas that participate in the coalition, exchange balancing energy in a perfectly coordinated setup.
As a result, real-time tie-line flows among these areas are treated as free variables, allowing for
deviations from the day-ahead schedule. The coalition-dependent version of the preemptive model
is given by:
J(C)=minimize
ΦPR
∑
i∈I
(
C+i r
+
i +C
−
i r
−
i
)
+
∑
i∈I
Cipi+
∑
s∈S
pis
[∑
i∈I
Ci
(
p+is−p−is
)
+
∑
n∈N
Cshlshns
]
(4a)
subject to 0 ≤ χ′e ≤ 1, ∀e ∈ EC , (4b)
χ′e = χe, ∀e ∈ E \ EC , (4c)
Constraints (3b)− (3f) and (3h), ∀s ∈ S, (4d)
f`s = f`, ∀` ∈ ∪e∈E−(χ,C)Λe, ∀s ∈ S, (4e)(
r+i ,r
−
i ,
r+e ,r
−
e
)
∈ arg
{
minimize
ΦR
(1a) subject to constraints (1b) - (1e)
}
, (4f)(pi,wj ,
δn,f`
) ∈ arg {minimize
ΦD
(2a) subject to constraints (2b) - (2g)
}
, (4g)
where ΦPR = {χ′e, ∀e ∪ ΦR ∪ ΦD ∪ ΦsB, ∀s} is the set of primal optimization variables. For the
sake of brevity, the Lagrange multipliers of the lower-level optimization problems are omitted here,
but the complete set of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of problems (1) and (2) are listed
in Appendix C. Unless stated otherwise, the preemptive model refers to problem (4) associated
with J(A) and the corresponding optimal transmission allocation is denoted by {χˆe, ∀e}.
Model (4) is a stochastic bilevel optimization problem, since wind power uncertainty is described
by a finite set of scenarios S, with Wjs being the realization of stochastic generation of wind farm
j in scenario s and pis the corresponding probability of occurrence. The objective function (4a) to
be minimized is the expected system cost according to the sequential market structure described
in Section 2.2. Constraint (4b) bounds the share of transmission capacity χ′e ∈ [0, 1]E allocated to
reserve exchange for links e ∈ EC , where EC = {e |H(e, a) = 0, ∀a ∈ A\C} is the set of links among
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only the areas in the coalition C. The transmission capacity of the remaining links e ∈ E \ EC ,
i.e., links that are connected to areas that are not members of coalition C, is fixed according to
existing cross-border agreements χe ∈ [0, 1]E in (4c). Constraints (4d) ensure feasibility of re-
dispatch actions for each scenario, whereas constraint (4e) restricts the real-time tie-line flows
to the respective day-ahead values, for links e ∈ E−(χ, C) = {e ∈ E|χe = 0, and ∃a ∈ A \
C such that H(e, a) 6= 0}, which is the set of links that are, at least on one end, connected to
an area that is not in the coalition C and does not have an existing cross-border agreements for
reserves exchange, i.e., χe = 0. In other words, constraint (4e) prevents any imbalance netting or
exchange of balancing energy between areas that are not members of coalition C. Here, notice that
constraints (4e) are removed from problem (4) associated with J(A), since E(χ,A) = ∅ for any χ.
The lower-level problems (4f) and (4g) are identical to models (1) and (2) implementing the
shares of transmission capacities in χ′. Having this bilevel model (4) ensures by construction that
the reserve capacity, day-ahead and balancing markets are cleared in consecutive and independent
auctions, in accordance with the sequential market design. This structure allows the definition
of {χˆe, ∀e} anticipating the impact of these parameters in all subsequent trading floors. From
a computational perspective, to obtain a solvable instance of the model (4), we can equivalently
replace the lower-level problems (4f) and (4g) by the corresponding KKT conditions, given that (4f)
and (4g) are linear programs. The resulting problem is a single-level mathematical program with
equilibrium constraints (MPEC) that involves the non-convex complementary slackness constraints,
which can be transformed into a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) using disjunctive constraints.
We refer to Appendix C for the KKT conditions of problems (1) and (2).
Regarding the structure of the bilevel model (4), it should be noted that, in contrast to the
reserve capacity and the day-ahead markets, the balancing market clearing is modeled in the
upper-level problem by the last term of the objective function (4a) and constraints (4d)-(4e).
The proposed structure leverages the fact that the variables of the balancing market in (3) do
not enforce any restriction on the upper-level variables {χ′e, ∀e} and also they do not impact the
lower-level problems (4f) and (4g). Following this observation, the proposed formulation reduces
the computational complexity of the final MILP, since it avoids the integer reformulation of the
balancing market complementarity conditions for each scenario s ∈ S. For similar applications
of bilevel programming in the electricity markets, the interested reader is referred to (Pineda &
Morales, 2016; Morales et al., 2014; Dvorkin et al., 2018; Jensen et al., 2017).
Having defined the main properties of the preemptive model, the following comments are in
order. Define the sum of the costs (1a), (2a) and (3a), as Js
′
(∅) and Js′(A), when χe,∀e are
fixed to the existing cross-border arrangements and to the optimal {χˆe,∀e} from the preemptive
model, respectively. From an economic intuition, it follows that the preemptive model reduces
the total expected cost since the establishment of broader coalitions enlarges the pool of available
reserves and balancing resources, and enables the more efficient allocation of available generation
capacity between these services. This can be mathematically stated as J(A) = Es[Js(A)] ≤
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J(∅) = Es[Js(∅)], where Es[·] is the expectation calculated over the scenario set S. Using a
similar reasoning, it follows that J is a nonincreasing function with respect to the number of areas
participating in the coalition, i.e., J(C) ≤ J(Cˆ) for all Cˆ ⊆ C. (Note that the preemptive model does
not guarantee Js(C) ≤ Js(Cˆ), ∀Cˆ ⊆ C for each scenario independently.) It becomes apparent that
the implementation of the preemptive model results in a different system cost than the one under
the current sequential market. Next, we discuss cost allocation in this new sequential market.
3.3. Cost allocation for the preemptive model
The preemptive model (4) implements a centralized transmission allocation mechanism, under
the implicit assumption that all areas are willing to accept the {χˆe,∀e} solution that by construction
minimizes the system-wide expected cost. However, this model does not suggest an area-specific
cost allocation that guarantees sufficient incentives for all areas to remain in the grand coalition A.
The task of setting the transmission shares and allocating the resulting costs could be ac-
complished through the establishment of a new trading floor, cleared before the reserve capacity
market, in which regional operators would place their bids/offers for the reservation of inter-area
transmission capacities, akin to the decision variable of the preemptive model, {χ′e, ∀e}. This new
market would constitute an ideal benchmark of the market-based allocation process described in
(EC, 2017), implementing a complete market for inter-area transmission allocations in which ca-
pacities would be traded based on bids/offers that reflect the valuations from regional operators.
In this work, we follow an alternative path to promote the formation of stable coalitions for the
exchange of reserves. Our approach builds an ex-post benefit allocation mechanism on top of the
preemptive model, aiming to realize the necessary conditions that accomplish the coordination re-
quirements of this model. The proposed mechanism is readily compatible with the existing market
structure and does not require the establishment of any new marketplace. In the remainder of this
section, we outline the main concepts related to benefit allocations for the preemptive model and
we discuss the desirable properties that we want to achieve.
Let Jsa(∅) denote the cost allocated to area a in scenario s in the existing sequential market.
As previously discussed, the current implementation of the sequential market provides a cost allo-
cation method that satisfies budget balance under every scenario, i.e., Js(∅) = ∑a∈A Jsa(∅). The
implementation of the preemptive model requires a new method to allocate costs to the areas that
participate in this arrangement. This task can equivalently be viewed as allocating benefits based
on the change in the total cost as a discount or a mark-up on the original cost allocation of each
area defined by Jsa(∅). While choosing these benefits, our main goal is to ensure that all areas in A
are willing to use the preemptive model as a decision-support tool, since otherwise some areas may
opt for having their own reserve exchange agreement. Moreover, we should aim to form coalitions
as large as possible in order to achieve the highest reduction in the expected system cost.
To achieve these objectives, we will treat the preemptive model in a coalitional game framework,
which allows us to approach the benefit allocation problem in two ways. First, we can allocate
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the expected cost reduction, J(∅) − J(A) ≥ 0, to all areas as benefits. Allocating benefits this
way achieves budget balance in expectation, which implies that there is no deficit or surplus if the
preemptive model is used repeatedly and the uncertainty modeling is accurate enough.1 However,
this method does not guarantee that the resulting allocation satisfies budget balance in every
scenario, thus requiring a large financial reserve to buffer the fluctuations in the budget in case
of surplus or deficit for some uncertainty realizations. The second approach is to allocate the
scenario-specific cost variation, Js(∅) − Js(A). This method would guarantee budget balance for
every scenario. However, the areas participating in the coalition would collect benefits that vary
under different scenarios, possibly raising also risk considerations.
4. Coalitional Game Theory Framework
A coalitional game is defined by a set of players and the so-called coalitional value function,
that maps from the subsets of players to the values, i.e., the total benefits created by these play-
ers (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). In the preemptive model, the set of players are given by the set
of areas A, whereas the coalitional value function v : 2A → R can be defined either as the expected
cost reduction achieved, i.e., v¯(C) = J(∅) − J(C), for all C ⊆ A or based on the resulting change
in the cost of the realized scenario s ∈ S, i.e., vs(C) = Js(∅) − Js(C), for all C ⊆ A. Clearly, it
holds that v¯(C) = Es[vs(C)]. Later, we will see that these functions yield different structures for the
coalitional game. In the remainder of this section, we study a generic function v for the preemptive
model satisfying v(C) = 0, for all |C| ≤ 1. This assumption holds since coordination is not possible
in the preemptive model without the participation of at least two adjacent areas.
Given the coalitional value function v, a benefit allocation mechanism defines the benefit re-
ceived by each area a ∈ A with βa(v) ∈ R. The cost allocated to area a under the preemptive
transmission allocation model would then be given by Jsa(A) = Jsa(∅) − βa(v). Depending on its
sign, the benefit can be considered as a discount or a mark-up on the original cost allocation.
When designing benefit allocation mechanisms, there are three fundamental properties we want
to guarantee, namely, efficiency, individual rationality, and stability. A benefit allocation β(v) =
{βa(v)}a∈A ∈ RA is efficient if the whole value created by the grand coalition, i.e., C = A, is
allocated to the member-areas, i.e.,
∑
a∈A βa(v) = v(A).2 A benefit allocation ensures individual
rationality if all areas obtain nonnegative benefits, i.e., βa(v) ≥ 0, for all a ∈ A. If this property
does not hold, the coordination arrangement would yield increased costs for some areas. As a
result, these areas may decide not to participate in the preemptive model. Finally, a benefit
allocation attains stability (in other words, group rationality) if it eliminates the incentives of the
1This conclusion requires that the scenario set fully describes the uncertainties. In practice, this is inevitably an
approximation to the real world. There are various results showing asymptotic guarantees in a convex optimization
framework as long as the scenario set is rich enough, see (Birge & Louveaux, 2011)
2In coalitional games, efficiency is also often referred to as budget balance. For clarity, we use efficiency for the
benefit allocation, and the term budget balance is reserved for the cost allocation.
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areas to form sub-coalitions, i.e., @C ⊂ A such that v(C) > ∑a∈C βa(v). This last property is
crucial for the preemptive model, since otherwise some areas may opt for having their own reserve
exchange agreement by excluding the remaining areas. This coincides with our aforementioned
goal of ensuring that all areas participate in the preemptive model.
In coalitional game theory, these properties are known to be attained if the benefit allocation lies
in the core defined as β(v) ∈ KCore(v), where KCore(v) = {β ∈ RA |
∑
a∈A βa = v(A),
∑
a∈C βa ≥
v(C), ∀C ⊂ A}. In this definition, the equality constraint ensures efficiency, while inequality con-
straints guarantee stability, i.e., there is no subset of areas C ⊂ A that can yield higher total benefits
for its members compared to the benefit allocation under the grand coalition. The inequality con-
straints also include βa(v) ≥ v(a) = 0 for all a ∈ A.3 This restriction ensures individual rationality.
The core is a closed polytope involving 2|A| linear constraints. This polytope is nonempty if and
only if the coalitional game is balanced (Shapley, 1967). Such settings include the cases in which
the coalitional value function exhibits supermodularity4 (Shapley, 1971) and the cases in which
the coalitional value function can be modeled by a concave exchange economy (Shapley & Shubik,
1969), a linear production game (Owen, 1975) or a risk-sharing game (Cso´ka et al., 2009). In their
most general form, the coalitional value functions in these works are given by an optimization prob-
lem minimizing a convex objective subject to linear constraints. In the problem at hand, coalitional
value functions are associated with solutions to the general non-convex optimization problem (4).
As a result, previous works on the nonemptiness of the core are not applicable to our setup.
In case the core is empty, we need to devise a method to approximate a core allocation. To this
end, we bring in the notion of strong -core, defined in (Shapley & Shubik, 1966) as KCore(v, ) =
{β ∈ RA | ∑a∈A βa = v(A), ∑a∈C βa ≥ v(C) − , ∀C ⊂ A}. This definition can be interpreted as
follows. If organizing a coalitional deviation entails an additional cost of  ∈ R, coalition values
would be given by v(C)−  for all C 6= A. Then, the resulting core would correspond to the strong
-core. For  = 0, we retrieve the original core definition, i.e., KCore(v, 0) = KCore(v).
Let ∗(v) be the critical value of  such that the strong -core is nonempty, which is mathemat-
ically defined as ∗(v) = min{ |KCore(v, ) 6= ∅}. The value ∗(v) is guaranteed to be finite for any
function v and the set KCore(v, 
∗(v)) is called the least-core (Maschler et al., 1979). Let the excess
of a coalition be defined by θ(v, β, C) = v(C)−∑a∈C βa, for any nonempty C ⊂ A. In other words,
the set KCore(v, 
∗(v)) is the set of all efficient benefit allocations minimizing the maximum excess.
If the core is empty, the maximum excess is the maximum violation of a stability constraint. This
implies that the least-core achieves an approximate stability property. As a remark, the least-core
relaxes also the inequality constraints corresponding to singleton sets βa ≥ v(a) − ∗(v) = −∗(v)
for all a ∈ A since ∗(v) > 0, and hence it yields approximate individual rationality. Finally, if the
core is not empty, we have ∗(v) ≤ 0 and the least-core is a subset of the core.
3For the sake of simplicity, singleton sets are denoted by a instead of {a}.
4Supermodularity is attained if for any set the participation of an area results in a larger value increment when
compared to the subsets of the set under consideration, i.e., v(C∪{a})−v(C) ≥ v(C′∪{a})−v(C′), ∀a /∈ C, C′ ⊂ C ⊆ A.
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With the discussion above, we conclude that whenever the core is empty, we can use the
least-core to achieve the second best outcome available, i.e., a benefit allocation which is efficient,
approximately individually rational and approximately stable. Observe that there are generally
many points to choose from the least-core (or the core if it is nonempty) achieving the same fun-
damental properties. In this case, it could be desirable to require additional intuitively acceptable
properties to pick a unique benefit allocation. Later, we revisit this idea in our proposed methods.
Apart from the aforementioned fundamental properties that pertain to the economic side of
the problem, computational tractability is also a practical concern, considering that we may need
the complete list of coalition values v(C) for all C ⊆ A to fully describe the core and the least-core.
For the coalitional games arising from the preemptive model, each coalition value requires another
solution to MILP in (4), which is NP-hard in general. Hence, our goal is to find a core or a least-
core benefit allocation that can be computed with limited queries to the coalitional value function.
Next, we briefly review two benefit allocation mechanisms that are widely used in the literature.
4.1. Shapley value
The benefit assigned by the Shapley value is given by βShapleya (v) =
∑
C⊆A
(|C|−1)!(|A|−|C|)!
|A|! (v(C)−
v(C \a)). This benefit is the average of the marginal contribution of the area a under all coalitions,
considering also all possible orderings of areas. The Shapley value results in an efficient benefit
allocation. Individual rationality is also satisfied if the coalitional value function is nondecreasing,
since the marginal contributions would be nonnegative. On the other hand, the Shapley value is
guaranteed to lie in the core only when the coalitional value function is supermodular (Shapley,
1971). This is a restrictive condition that is not applicable to our problem. In addition, when the
core is empty, the Shapley value does not necessarily lie in the least-core, making it incompatible
with the fundamental properties we desire (Maschler et al., 1979). In terms of the computational
performance, the calculation of the Shapley value requires the exhaustive enumeration of coalition
values v(C) for all C ⊆ A. Finally, it should be noted that the Shapley value is the unique efficient
benefit allocation that satisfies dummy player, symmetry, and additivity properties simultaneously.
Dummy player property requires βa = 0 for all a for which v(C) − v(C \ a) = 0 for all C ⊆ A. In
other words, an area incapable of contributing to any coalition C ends up with zero benefits. Next,
we show the relation between the previously discussed properties and the dummy player property.
Proposition 1. For the core and the least-core, we have, (i) if a′ satisfies v(A) − v(A \ a′) =
0, then KCore(v) ⊂ {β |βa′ = 0}, (ii) if a′ satisfies v(C) − v(C \ a′) = 0 for all C ⊆ A, then
KCore(v, 
∗(v)) ⊂ {β |βa′ = 0}.
This result shows that the core attains a more restrictive version of the dummy player property,
i.e., an area incapable of contributing to the set A ends up with zero benefits. Finally, the least-core
attains the dummy player property in the same way that it is defined for the Shapley value. The
proof and the discussions on symmetry and additivity are relegated to Appendix D.
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4.2. Nucleolus allocation
Among all efficient benefit allocations, the nucleolus allocation is the unique benefit allocation
that minimizes the excesses of all coalitions in a lexicographic manner (Schmeidler, 1969). Nucleolus
allocation lies in the least-core and hence attains the desirable economic properties. In terms
of practical implementation, the lexicographic minimization is computationally demanding in the
general case. Nucleolus allocation can be computed by solving a sequence of O(|A|) linear programs
with constraint sets that are parametrized versions of the core KCore(v), see (Kopelowitz, 1967;
Fromen, 1997). However, each linear program requires the complete list of coalition values. In
case the coalition values are given implicitly by the objective value of a single linear optimization
problem with constraints depending on the participants of the coalition, the work by Hallefjord et al.
(1995) proposes using constraint generation algorithms. In this approach, each linear program is
solved by a separate constraint generation algorithm that iteratively generates coalitional values on
demand. Nevertheless, we may still need to generate all possible coalition values (Hallefjord et al.,
1995; Kimms & C¸etiner, 2012). When the number of areas is large, this approach involving the
execution of the constraint generation algorithm O(|A|) times becomes computationally prohibitive
for our application. For the sake of completeness, Appendix E provides the mathematical definition
for the nucleolus allocation and its comparison with the Shapley value.
5. Benefit Allocation Mechanisms for Preemptive Transmission Allocation
In this section, the first benefit allocation mechanism, which is an ex-ante process with respect to
the uncertainty realization, employs as coalitional value function the expected cost reduction from
the preemptive transmission allocation model. The second mechanism is an ex-post process that
can be applied only when the scenario s ∈ S is unveiled, since it uses as coalitional value function
the scenario-specific cost variation. For each coalitional game, we first discuss the implications of
the structure of the game on the tools we reviewed from the literature in Section 4. We then propose
our approach, the least-core selecting mechanism. Our mechanism comes with a computational
improvement over the nucleolus and it can approximate additional criteria, for instance, fairness.
5.1. Benefit allocations for expected cost reduction
For the ex-ante allocation mechanism, the coalitional value function v¯(C) = J(∅) − J(C) ≥
0 for all C ⊆ A is nondecreasing, since J is nonincreasing. Given the function v¯, an efficient
benefit allocation,
∑
a∈A βa(v¯) = v¯(A), would result in a cost allocation that is budget balanced
in expectation, since J(A) = J(∅)− v¯(A) = Es
[∑
a∈A J
s
a(∅)
]−∑a∈A βa(v¯) = Es[∑a∈A Jsa(A)].
While designing a benefit allocation mechanism, our goal is to achieve the three fundamental
properties, i.e., efficiency, individual rationality and stability, associated with the core KCore(v¯).
However, as already mentioned, the previous results on the nonemptiness of the core are not
applicable to our problem. Thus, we have the following condition that is applicable to some
specialized instances of the coalitional value function v¯.
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Proposition 2. KCore(v¯) is nonempty if there exists an area a
′ ∈ A such that v¯(A \ a′) = 0.
The proof is relegated to Appendix F. Note that this condition can only be found in specialized
instances of the preemptive model. For instance, in the case of a star graph (A, E), the central area
would satisfy this condition, since it is indispensable for enabling any reserve exchange. However,
in a general graph, the core could potentially be empty and we focus on this case in the illustrative
example provided in Section 6.1.3.
In case of an empty core, our goal is to achieve a least-core solution, which can be perceived as
the second best outcome in our context. Other than approximating the stability property, the least-
core also approximates the individual rationality property by relaxing the inequality constraints
for singleton sets, i.e., βa ≥ v¯(a) − ∗(v¯) = −∗(v¯) for all a ∈ A. The following proposition shows
that the least-core is compatible with the individual rationality property for the function v¯.
Proposition 3. KCore(v¯, 
∗(v¯)) lies in RA+.
The proof is relegated to Appendix G. It relies on the observation that any least-core allocation
violating the individual rationality would imply the existence of an  < ∗, such that KCore(v¯, ) is
nonempty, contradicting the definition of the least-core. Thus, we can use the least-core to achieve
efficiency, individual rationality and approximate stability, whenever the core is empty.
For this coalitional game, the Shapley value satisfies efficiency and individual rationality, but
stability (or approximate stability) and computational tractability are not attained. We provide
an example for stability violation in Section 6.1.1. The nucleolus allocation, on the other hand,
lies in the least-core and it satisfies efficiency, individual rationality and approximate stability.5
Based on the previous discussions, we propose a least-core selecting mechanism that is mathe-
matically formulated as the following optimization problem:
minimize
, β
 subject to  ≥ 0, β ∈ KCore(v¯, ). (5)
Let ˆ denote the optimal value of  for this problem. If the core is empty, we have ˆ = ∗(v¯) > 0
and problem (5) finds a least-core allocation. On the other hand, if the core is nonempty, we have
ˆ = 0 and problem (5) finds instead a core benefit allocation, which attains properties of efficiency,
individual rationality and stability. The nucleolus allocation always forms an optimal solution pair
with ˆ to problem (5), since it lies in the least-core. In fact, there are in general many optimal
solutions to this problem. To this end, we will propose an additional criterion for tie-breaking.
Let βc be a desirable and a fair benefit allocation that is easy to compute but not necessarily
in the core or in the least-core. An example could be the marginal contribution of each area βm :
βma = v¯(A)−v¯(A\a) for all a ∈ A which requires |A|+2 calls to problem (4). Receiving the marginal
5Note that the function v¯ is given implicitly by the optimization problem (4). For this problem, constraints (4b)
and (4c) change depending on the participants of the coalition. This would allow us to generalize the computation
of the nucleolus via the sequential constraint generation algorithms provided in (Hallefjord et al., 1995).
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contribution can be regarded as a fair outcome.6 This allocation satisfies individual rationality,
dummy player and symmetry properties. However, it is generally not efficient, see (Krishna, 2009),
and not stable, see (Karaca & Kamgarpour, 2018). Another example could be βeq = (v¯(A)/|A|)1>
which assigns equal importance to each area. This choice requires two calls to problem (4) and it
satisfies efficiency and individual rationality. However, this allocation also violates stability.
Starting from such a desirable benefit allocation, we can solve the following problem
minimize
β
||β − βc||22 subject to β ∈ KCore(v¯, ˆ), (6)
to obtain a unique benefit allocation for problem (5). The uniqueness follows from having a strictly
convex objective. Let βˆ(v¯, βc) denote the optimal value of β in problem (6). We define the benefit
allocation βˆ(v¯, βc) as the least-core selecting mechanism. This allocation achieves economic prop-
erties of the least-core, and also the core if the core is nonempty, while approximating an additional
criterion defined by βc. For instance, if the marginal contribution βm is chosen, problem (6) would
pick the allocation βˆ(v¯, βm) approximating the fairness of the marginal contribution.
Characterizing the constraint sets of problems (5) and (6) still requires exponentially many
solutions to (4). We show that (5) and (6) can be solved by a single constraint generation algorithm.
Constraint generation algorithm:
Here, we describe the steps of the constraint generation algorithm at iteration k ≥ 1. Let
Fk ⊂ 2A denote the family of coalitions for which we have already generated the coalition values.
The algorithm first obtains a candidate solution by solving a relaxed version of problem (5) as
follows:
minimize
, β
 subject to  ≥ 0, β ≥ 0,
∑
a∈A
βa = v¯(A),
∑
a∈C
βa ≥ v¯(C)− , ∀C ∈ Fk. (7)
Let the optimal solution be denoted by k. Clearly, it satisfies ˆ ≥ k. Then, we solve the following
problem as a tie-breaker:
minimize
β
||β − βc||22 subject to β ≥ 0,
∑
a∈A
βa = v¯(A),
∑
a∈C
βa ≥ v¯(C)− k, ∀C ∈ Fk. (8)
Denote the optimal benefit allocation for problem (8) by βk. This allocation would form an optimal
solution pair to problem (7) with k. In principle, F1 can potentially be chosen as an empty set,
by setting 1 equal to zero and removing the last set of constraints in (8).
Given a candidate allocation βk, we can then generate the coalition with the maximum stability
6This allocation coincides with the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, which is equivalent to the externality of
each area (Krishna, 2009). In an auction, this allocation ensures that truthfully reporting the preferences is a
dominant strategy Nash equilibrium. Note that we assumed no strategic behaviour from the regional operators.
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violation by solving the following problem, which treats βk as a fixed parameter:
maximize
C⊆A
v¯(C)−
∑
a∈C
βka . (9)
Denote the optimal solution by Ck, and the optimal value by ηk. Using the fact that the coalitional
value function v¯ is given implicitly by the MILP version of the preemptive model (4), we can
show that problem (9) has an equivalent MILP reformulation, which can be solved by off-the-shelf
optimization solvers. Using this approach, we eliminate the need for evaluating v¯(C) for all C ⊆ A
to solve problem (9). This MILP reformulation is relegated to Appendix H. Finally, this problem
generates the coalition value v¯(Ck) = ηk +∑a∈Ck βka , and we add Ck to Fk for the next iteration.
In order to define a stopping criterion ensuring that the iterative solution of problems (7), (8)
and (9) converges to the optimal solution of problem (6), we need the following two observations.
First, if k > 0 in problem (7), then there exists a set C ∈ Fk such that v¯(C) −∑a∈C βka = k,
which implies that ηk ≥ k. On the other hand, if k = 0, by setting C = A we can show that
ηk ≥ v¯(A)−∑a∈A βka = 0 = k. Based on these remarks, we have ηk ≥ k for any iteration k.
The iterative solution of problems (7), (8) and (9) terminates when ηk = k. In this case, prob-
lem (9) provides a certificate that the pair (k, βk) is a feasible solution to problem (5). Note that
this pair is also optimal to a relaxed version of problem (5), given by problem (7). This concludes
that (k, βk) is optimal for problem (5). Observing that k = ˆ and using a similar reasoning, we
conclude that βk is the optimal solution to problem (6). Hence, the algorithm converges.
In the intermediate solution points of the iterative process, we have ηk > k and consequently
Ck /∈ Fk according to the optimality of k for problem (7). We then extend the family of generated
coalitions by Fk+1 = Fk∪Ck until convergence is achieved. Since there are finitely many coalitions
to be generated, the algorithm converges after a finite number of iterations. As a remark, the
algorithm would not generate any set from F1, the full set, the empty set, and the singleton
sets (since we enforce β ≥ 0 in problem (7)). In practice, even when there are many areas, the
algorithm requires the generation of only several coalition values. We show this in the numerical
results. Finally, we summarized this iterative algorithm in Appendix H.
5.2. Benefit allocations per scenario
As previously explained, allocating benefits for the expected cost reduction does not guarantee
that the resulting cost allocation satisfies budget balance in every scenario. Having a surplus
or a deficit might be undesirable, since this may necessitate a large financial reserve to buffer
the fluctuations in the budget. To address this issue, here we focus on the allocation of the
the scenario-specific cost variation, Js(∅) − Js(A). The coalitional value function in this case is
given by vs(C) = Js(∅)− Js(C), for all C ⊂ A. Observe that the set function vs is not necessarily
nondecreasing, while it can also map to negative reals, since the preemptive transmission allocation
model does not guarantee that Js(C) ≤ Js(∅) holds. Given the function vs, an efficient benefit
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allocation mechanism,
∑
a∈A βa(v
s) = vs(A), would result in a cost allocation that is budget
balanced in scenario s, since Js(A) = Js(∅)− vs(A) = ∑a∈A Jsa(∅)−∑a∈A βa(vs) = ∑a∈A Jsa(A).
Aiming at establishing a per-scenario benefit allocation, our goal now is to achieve the properties
of the scenario-specific core KCore(v
s). However, neither the previous results nor Proposition 2
apply to this core to prove that it is nonempty as it can be affirmed by the following result.
Proposition 4. KCore(v
s) is empty if there exists C ⊂ A such that vs(A) < vs(C).
The proof is relegated to Appendix I. In practice, the condition above would prevent the
formation of the grand coalition A, as shown in the illustrative example of Section 6.1.1. The
coalition value vs(A) being negative is a special case of Proposition 4, since we would then have
vs(A) < vs(a) = 0 for all a ∈ A. We see that it may not be realistic to achieve all three fundamental
properties, and we should instead aim for the least-core KCore(v
s, ∗(vs)). Note that in this case
Proposition 3 is not applicable and the least-core would instead achieve efficiency, approximate
individual rationality, and approximate stability.
For the coalitional game arising from the function vs, the Shapley value satisfies efficiency, but
individual rationality, stability, and computational tractability are not attained. On the other hand,
the nucleolus allocation provides a least-core allocation. Note that, in contrast to the expected
coalitional value function v¯, the function vs is not implicitly given by an optimization problem.
Instead, it is an ex-post calculation from the sequential electricity market after the uncertainty
realization. As a result, the coalitional value function vs is not amenable to a constraint generation
approach. This would prevent the iterative computations of the nucleolus and also the least-core
selecting mechanism from problems (5) and (6) in case they are formulated for vs.
Next, we look at an alternative approach that can be computed in a computationally tractable
manner. This approach will extend our results from Section 5.1, showing that any efficient benefit
allocation for the expected cost reduction gives rise to an efficient scenario-specific benefit allocation
that results in budget balance in every scenario. Moreover, using the proposed approach we can
achieve the fundamental properties associated with the original benefit allocation in expectation.
Let β(v¯) ∈ RA+ be an efficient individually rational benefit allocation for the expected cost
reduction, computed prior to the uncertainty realization. We then define the following scenario-
specific benefit allocation, β(vs, β(v¯)) ∈ RA,
βa(v
s, β(v¯)) =
βa(v¯)
v¯(A) v
s(A), ∀a ∈ A. (10)
The benefit βa(v
s, β(v¯)) for each area a is computed based on an ex-post computation of vs(A)
for the specific uncertainty realization s. Given β(v¯), this definition does not require any further
solutions to the preemptive transmission allocation model or the sequential market. The term
βa(v¯)/v¯(A) ∈ [0, 1] can be considered as a percentage share of profits/losses depending on the
sign of vs(A). (This also holds for any other weighting from the |A|-simplex.) Notice that since
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∑
a∈A βa(v
s, β(v¯)) = vs(A), the efficiency property holds. Moreover, having E[βa(vs, β(v¯))] = βa(v¯)
implies that the scenario-specific benefit allocation β(vs, β(v¯)) satisfies in expectation the other
fundamental properties of the original benefit allocation β(v¯). As a remark, in case uncertainty
s /∈ S is unveiled, we can still compute the scenario-specific benefits, however, it would not be
possible to obtain any guarantees on the properties other than efficiency.
Given the above reasoning, we propose a scenario-specific least-core selecting mechanism, which
builds upon the least-core selecting benefit allocation mechanism from problems (5) and (6) to
define β(vs, βˆ(v¯, βc)) ∈ RA according to the procedure in (10). We have previously showed that
the allocation βˆ(v¯, βc) satisfies individual rationality and approximate stability, while enabling a
tractable computation via a constraint generation algorithm. In a similar vein, the scenario-specific
version β(vs, βˆ(v¯, βc)) will satisfy individual rationality and approximate stability in expectation,
while still enabling a tractable computation. We illustrate this approach in Section 6. As a
remark, it is possible to use the Shapley value and the nucleolus allocation in a similar manner.
The comparisons of these mechanisms in the previous section would remain unchanged.7
6. Numerical Case Studies
In this section, we first use an illustrative three-area nine-bus system to provide and discuss
benefit allocation mechanisms under different system configurations and stochastic renewable in-
feed. We then apply the models and the benefit allocation mechanisms in a more realistic case
study. All problems are solved with GUROBI 7.5 (Gurobi Optimization Inc., 2016) called through
MATLAB on a computer equipped with 32 GB RAM and a 4.0 GHz Intel i7 processor.
6.1. Illustrative three-area examples
We describe a base model, which will be subject to several modifications in the system con-
figuration and penetration of stochastic renewables to discuss the resulting changes in the benefit
allocations described in Sections 4 and 5. We consider the nine-bus system depicted in Figure 3
which comprises three areas. The intra-area transmission network consists of AC lines with capacity
and reactance equal to 100 MW and 0.13 p.u., respectively. The four tie lines between areas 1 and 2,
and between areas 2 and 3 are AC lines with capacity of 20 MW, and reactance of 0.13 p.u. each.
The day-ahead price offers and the generation capacities of conventional units are provided in
Table 1. Units i1, i4, and i7 are inflexible, i.e., these units cannot change their generation level
during real-time operation, while all remaining units are flexible offering half of their capacity for
upward and downward reserves provision at a cost equal to 10% of their day-ahead energy offer
7In contrast to the least-core selecting mechanism, βˆ(v¯, βc), the scenario-specific benefit allocation β(vs, βˆ(v¯, βc))
would lie in the least-core only in expectation and thus the benefits that each area receives would vary under different
scenarios. This implies, in turn, that coalition member areas are now exposed to risk and in case some of these areas
are risk-averse, they may not be willing to participate in the benefit allocation mechanism and the preemptive model.
Defining ways to incorporate risk measures is part of our ongoing work.
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D3 D6 D9i3 i6 i9
i1 i4 i7i2 i5 i8
j3 j6 j9
Area 1 : a1 Area 2 : a2 Area 3 : a3Link e1 Link e2
Figure 3: Nine-node three-area interconnected power system
C. The cost of load shedding Csh is equal to 1000e/MWh for the inelastic electricity demands
D3 = 220 MW, D6 = 190 MW, and D9 = 220 MW. In addition, there are three wind power
plants, j3, j6, and j9, with installed capacities 50, 80, and 50 MW, respectively. The stochastic
wind power generation is modeled using two scenarios, s1 and s2, listed in Table 2 with probability
of occurance 0.6 and 0.4, respectively. Hence, the corresponding expected wind power production
W j for j3 is equal to 42 MW, for j6 is equal to 70.4 MW, and for j9 is equal to 42 MW. Wind
power price offers and subsequently the wind power spillage costs are considered to be zero.
Table 1: Generator data
Unit i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8 i9
C (e/MWh) 20 30 40 30 40 50 25 35 45
P cap (MW) 120 50 50 120 50 50 120 50 50
Flexible No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Table 2: Wind scenarios as percentage of
the nominal value of the power plant
Wind power plant j3 j6 j9
Scenario s1 1 0.8 1
Scenario s2 0.6 1 0.6
Following the prevailing approach in which regional capacity markets are cleared separately,
we set the percentage of transmission capacity allocated to reserves exchange equal to χ = 0.
Reserve requirements for each area are calculated based on the probabilistic forecasts, such that
the largest negative and positive deviations from the expected wind power production foreseen in
the scenario set are covered by domestic resources. For instance, the upward and downward area
reserve requirements for area 1 are calculated as, RR+a1 = W j3 − min{Wj3s1 ,Wj3s2} = 12 MW,
and RR−a1 = max{Wj3s1 ,Wj3s2} −W j3 = 8 MW. For the other areas, these values are given as
RR+a2 = 6.4 MW, RR
−
a2 = 9.6 MW, RR
+
a3 = 12 MW, RR
−
a3 = 8 MW.
The market costs and transmission allocations resulting from the preemptive model are provided
in Table 3. The preemptive model reallocated transmission resources from the day-ahead energy
trading to the reserve capacity trading, increasing the costs in the day-ahead market. This realloca-
tion yields an expected system cost of 13,238.0e, which translates to 25.9% reduction compared to
the cost of 17,871.2e from the existing sequential market. Under the existing setup with χ = 0, the
uncertainty realization s2 leads to significant load shedding in the balancing stage. In this scenario,
even though we have enough reserve capacity, we are not able to deploy it due to network congestion.
This problem is avoided by enabling reserve exchange when the preemptive model is implemented.
Quantities assigned to each generator at all trading floors are provided in Appendix J.
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We now provide a budget balanced cost allocation method for the existing sequential market.
For this method, we assume that all three trading floors are cleared by marginal pricing mecha-
nisms (zonal prices for the reserve capacities, nodal prices for the day-ahead and balancing energy
services), albeit, similar methods can be applied also to other payment mechanisms. This method
assigns producer and consumer surpluses, and congestion rents of the intra-area lines to their cor-
responding areas, and divides the congestion rents of the tie lines equally between the adjacent
areas, see (Kristiansen et al., 2018). Budget balance holds since the market cost is given by the
opposite of the sum of producer and consumer surpluses, and congestion rent for each trading floor.
These values are summarized in Appendix J. We refer to Table 4 for the resulting cost allocations.
Area 1 is allocated a large cost in scenario s2 because of the load shedding in node 3.
Table 3: Comparison of market costs (in e)
Model Existing Seq. Market Preemptive Model
[χe1 , χe2 ] [0, 0] [0, 0.0592]
Reserve capacity cost 194.0 191.6
Day-ahead cost 13,087.2 13,120.2
Balancing cost in s1 1,150.0 −410.7
Balancing cost in s2 9,750.0 431.5
Total cost in s1 14,431.2 12,901.2
Total cost in s2 23,031.2 13,743.4
Table 4: Cost allocation for each area in
the existing sequential market (in e)
Areas Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
Js1a (∅) 4,348.4 9,853.8 229.0
Js2a (∅) 16,348.4 3,453.8 3,229.0
6.1.1. Comparison of the different benefit allocations
Benefit allocation mechanisms for the expected cost reduction are provided in Figure 4. The
core is nonempty since area 2 satisfies the veto condition in Proposition 2. Marginal contribution
benefit allocation βm is not in the core since it is not efficient. We provide this allocation since it
can be regarded as a fair outcome. Observe that the marginal contributions of areas 1 and 2 are
larger than that of area 3. This is because area 1 has low cost generators and area 2 is indispensable
for any coordination considering that in the current network configuration, in which areas 1 and 3
are not directly interconnected, area 2 has to act as an intermediary for any reserves exchange.
Figure 4: Benefit allocations for the three-area system (in
e)
Figure 5: Benefit allocations after connecting areas 1 and
3 (in e)
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The Shapley value βShapley is not in the core. Among the core constraints, combining
∑
a∈A βa =
v(A) with ∑a∈A\aˆ βa ≥ v(A \ aˆ) implies that βaˆ ≤ βmaˆ = v(A)− v(A \ aˆ), or equivalently, no area
can receive more than its marginal contribution in the core. This condition is violated for the
Shapley value assigned to area 3. The coalitional value function is also not supermodular, since
v¯({1, 2, 3})−v¯({1, 2}) 6≥ v¯({2, 3})−v¯({2}) =⇒ 4,633.1−4,460.5 6≥ 826.8−0.On the other hand, the
nucleolus βNuc is in the core, however, the lexicographic minimization results in allocating benefits
to area 3. We later see that there is a core allocation that better approximates the marginal
contribution in terms of minimizing the Euclidean distance by allocating no benefits to area 3.
Finally, we employ our approach approximating two different criteria, i.e., marginal contribu-
tion and equal shares, with corresponding allocations being denoted as βˆ(v¯, βm)) and βˆ(v¯, βeq)),
respectively. These two outcomes are different from each other, and they approximate their respec-
tive fairness consideration in an effective manner. This criterion should be decided either by the
regulator or it should be based on the consensus of participating areas. In the following, we will
approximate the marginal contribution, since similar discussions can be made for any other criteria.
Next, we study the budget balance per scenario for the cost allocation in the preemptive model.
For all efficient benefit allocations of the expected cost reduction, i.e., all methods except the
marginal contribution allocation, the budget
∑
a∈A J
s
a(A)−Js(A) remains unchanged. In scenario
s1, there is a deficit of 3,103.1e, whereas in scenario s2 there is a surplus of 4,654.7e, thus budget
balance is obtained in expectation. In the coalitional game arising from the scenario-specific cost
variation, despite that KCore(v¯) is nonempty, the core KCore(v
s1) is empty, since the condition
in Proposition 4 is satisfied by vs1({1, 2}) = Js1(∅) − Js1({1, 2}) > Js1(∅) − Js1({1, 2, 3}) =
vs1({1, 2, 3}) =⇒ 14,431.2 − 12,884.6 > 14,431.2 − 12,901.2. For scenario s2, this condition is not
found and KCore(v
s2) is nonempty, since the coalitional game is supermodular.
To address the budget balance, we now employ the proposed scenario-specific least-core selecting
mechanism. The scenario-specific allocations generated by βˆ(v¯, βm) for the expected cost reduc-
tion are given by β(vs1 , βˆ(v¯, βm)) = [628.5, 901.5, 0]> and β(vs2 , βˆ(v¯, βm)) = [3,815.2, 5,472.6, 0]>.
These allocations result in a budget balanced cost allocation under both scenarios, since they sum
up to the scenario-specific cost variations in Table 3. In the remainder, we will focus our efforts on
the coalitional game arising from the expected cost reduction, since we can always map the benefit
allocations to the scenario-specific case using our proposed approach.
6.1.2. Impact of the uncertainties on benefit allocations
Here, we aim to assess the impact of the spatial correlation of the wind power forecast errors on
the outcome of the different benefit allocation mechanisms that we consider in this work. In order
to eliminate the impact of the network topology (cf. Appendix K), we connect areas 1 and 3 via
two AC lines. The first connects nodes 1 and 8, and the second connects nodes 3 and 9, each with
transmission capacity of 20 MW, and reactance of 0.13 p.u. The area graph is not a star anymore,
and Proposition 2 is not applicable. However, we verified that the core is still nonempty.
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The resulting benefit allocations for the expected cost reduction are provided in Figure 5,
which shows that areas 1 and 2 receive most of the benefit under every allocation mechanism. This
outcome can be explained considering that these areas have complementary wind power production
scenarios, i.e., the corresponding wind power scenarios exhibit negative correlation. Moreover,
area 1 has low cost generation. Finally, notice that the total benefits are greater than the ones
from the example in Section 6.1.1. This follows since compared to Section 6.1.1 expected system
cost is increased by 49% (26,687.9e) in the existing sequential market due to additional network
dependencies, whereas this cost is decreased by 0.01% (13,161.0e) in the preemptive model.
6.1.3. Benefit allocations in the case of an empty core
A natural question that arises in the context of this work is how the different benefit alloca-
tion mechanisms perform when we have an empty core, which can occur when the condition in
Proposition 2 is not found. To this end, we modify the example in Section 6.1.2 by changing the
wind scenarios. The stochastic wind power generation is modeled using two scenarios, s1 and s2
with probability of occurance 0.8 and 0.2. We have 1 and 0.8 for j3, 0.4 and 1 for j6, 0.4 and 1 for
j9 as the percentages of the nominal values of the plants, respectively. Hence, the corresponding
expected wind power productions for j3 is equal to 48 MW, for j6 is equal to 41.6 MW, and for j9
is equal to 26 MW. The reserve requirements are recomputed accordingly. Since the uncertainty is
significantly increased, we allow the units i1, i4, and i7 to be flexible in order to ensure feasibility.
The resulting benefit allocations for the expected cost reduction are provided in Figure 6.
We observe that the nucleolus and the least-core selecting benefit allocation coincide. For both
allocations, the maximum violation of a stability constraint is given by ∗ = 924.9e, where ∗(v¯) =
min{ |KCore(v¯, ) 6= ∅}. On the other hand, the maximum stability violation for the Shapley value
is 2,752.0e. In other words, if the Shapley value is utilized, there are 3 times the profits to be
made by not participating in the preemptive model compared to the case implementing a least-core
allocation. We see that all benefit allocation mechanisms allocated the most benefits to area 1, since
it has low cost generation and also its wind profile complements the wind profiles of areas 2 and 3.
Figure 6: Benefit allocations in case the core is empty (in e)
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6.2. Case study based on the IEEE RTS
We now consider a six-area power system that is based on the modernized version of the IEEE
Reliability Test System (RTS) presented in (Pandzic et al., 2014). The definitions of the areas
correspond to the ones proposed by Dvorkin et al. (2018) and Jensen et al. (2017), and they
are provided in Appendix L. The nodal positions, types, generation capacities and offers from
conventional and wind power generators, and transmission line parameters are provided in (Karaca
et al., 2019a). Due to their limited flexibility, nuclear, coal and integrated gasification combined
cycle (IGCC) units do not provide any reserves. On the other hand, open and combined cycle gas
turbines (OCGT and CCGT) offer 50% of their capacity for upward and downward reserves at a
cost equal to 20% of their day-ahead energy offer. Wind power production is modeled using a set
of 10 equiprobable scenarios that capture the spatial correlation of forecast errors over the different
wind farm locations provided in (Bukhsh, 2017). The demand is inelastic with the cost of load
shedding equal to 1,000e/MWh. In the existing sequential market, the percentage of transmission
capacity allocated to reserves exchange is set to χ = 0, while the reserve requirements are calculated
according to the methodology discussed in Section 6.1.
Table 5 compares the system costs and transmission allocations resulting from the existing mar-
ket with χ fixed to zero and the preemptive model where χ is a decision variable. The preemptive
model yields an expected cost of 87,594.8e, which translates to 2.3% reduction compared to the
cost of 89,696.4e from the existing market. This can be explained by 2,097.6e reduction in the
expected balancing cost obtained by eliminating the need for load shedding. Using the approach in
Section 6.1, we provide the expected values for a budget balanced cost allocation for the existing
sequential market in Table 6.
Table 5: Comparison of market costs (in e)
Model Existing Seq. Market Preemptive Model
χ = [χe1 , . . . , χe7 ] [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] [0, 0.359, 0, 0.038, 0, 0, 0]
Reserve capacity cost 2,392.5 2,389.4
Day-ahead cost 90,734.2 90,733.3
Expected balancing cost −3,430.3 −5,527.9
Expected cost 89,696.4 87,594.8
Table 6: Expected cost allocation for each area in the existing sequential market (in e)
Areas Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 4 Area 5 Area 6
Es[Jsa(∅)] 8,966.1 25,252.6 10,085.2 10,208.2 25,151.1 10,033.2
The results of the different benefit allocation mechanisms for the expected cost reduction are
provided in Figure 7. We verified that the core is nonempty even though the condition in Propo-
sition 2 is not satisfied. Marginal contribution benefit allocation is not in the core since it is not
efficient, whereas the Shapley value is not in the core since areas 3, 5, and 6 receive more than
their marginal contributions. The nucleolus and the least-core selecting benefit allocation mech-
anisms result in core allocations. Notice that our approach provides a different benefit allocation
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depending on the criteria considered. The nucleolus allocation is not consistent with the marginal
contribution allocation since it allocates more benefits to area 4 compared to area 1. All mecha-
nisms allocated the most benefits to area 2, since it has a central role by being well-connected in
the area graph. On the other hand, areas 1 and 4 are also allocated a significant amount, since they
are the two largest areas with wind profiles complementing each other as it is shown in Figure 8.
We now provide the computational comparison for the different benefit allocation mechanisms.
The coalitions J(∅) and J(A) are precomputed to obtain v(A), in 19.4 and 35.4 seconds, re-
spectively. The calculation of the marginal contribution allocation, which involves solving the
preemptive model (4) for coalitions {A \ {a}}a∈A, requires 119.7 seconds. The Shapley value re-
quires solving the preemptive model (4) for all coalitions except the singleton sets, the empty set,
and the full set, i.e., 26− 6− 1− 1 = 58 coalitions, and the resulting computational time is 1,264.6
seconds. The least-core selecting mechanism with the marginal contribution criteria requires only a
single iteration from the constraint generation algorithm, which takes 84.8 seconds. This constraint
generation algorithm converges fast, since the initial family of coalitions F1 is not an empty set;
instead, it is given by the coalitions that were used to compute the marginal contribution alloca-
tion. On the other hand, the least-core selecting mechanism with the equal shares criteria requires
four iterations from the constraint generation algorithm, which takes 150.4 seconds. Notice that,
in this case, the initial family of coalitions F1 is an empty set. Finally, using the method proposed
in (Kopelowitz, 1967; Fromen, 1997), the nucleolus is computed by solving 15 linear programs
sequentially to find 21 coalitional equality constraints that fully describe the nucleolus allocation.
This computation takes 1,266.2 seconds, since it needs the complete list of coalition values. As
an alternative, the iterative method in (Hallefjord et al., 1995) would require running 15 separate
constraint generation algorithms, increasing significantly the computational time compared to the
least-core selecting mechanism, since each algorithm run requires at least one iteration of constraint
generation. In Appendix M, we provide modifications to the IEEE RTS case study verifying our
observations from the illustrative three-area nine-node system.
Figure 7: Benefit allocations for the IEEE RTS case
study (in e)
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Figure 8: The Pearson correlation coefficients for the
wind profiles of all areas
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7. Conclusion
In this work, we formulated a coalition-dependent version of the preemptive transmission allo-
cation model that defines the optimal inter-area transmission capacity allocation between energy
and reserves for a given set of areas participating in the coalition. We then accompanied this gen-
eral model with benefit allocation mechanisms such that all coalition member areas have sufficient
incentives to accept the solution proposed by the preemptive model. We formulated the coalitional
game both as an ex-ante and as an ex-post process with respect to the uncertainty realization and
we showed that the former results in budget balance in expectation, whereas the latter results in
budget balance in every uncertainty realization. Applying the prevailing benefit allocation mech-
anisms to a larger case study, we showed that they are unable to find a benefit allocation with
minimal stability violation within a reasonable computational timeframe. To address this issue for
both coalitional games under consideration, we proposed the least-core selecting benefit allocation
mechanism and we formulated an iterative constraint generation algorithm for the efficient compu-
tation of this allocation. Considering that this work aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion
towards the design of the transmission allocation model, our benefit allocation mechanism can be
adapted to different plausible fairness criteria that may be imposed by the regulatory authorities,
moving towards the full integration of the European balancing markets.
Our future work will explore the development of decentralized schemes that enable the coor-
dination of areas in terms of transmission allocation, while preserving privacy of the areas with
minimal exchange of intra-area information. Finally, analyzing the impact of out-of-sample uncer-
tainty realizations on the benefit allocation mechanisms would be interesting.
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Appendix A. Notation
Main notation is stated below. An illustration is provided in Figure A.9. Additional symbols
are defined throughout the paper when needed.
Sets and indices
A Set of areas indexed by a
E Set of inter-area links indexed by e
LAC Set of AC transmission lines indexed by `
ar(e/`) Receiving-end area of link e/line `
as(e/`) Sending-end area of link e/line `
Λe Set of tie-lines across link e
I Set of dispatchable power plants indexed by i
J Set of stochastic power plants indexed by j
N Set of network nodes (buses) indexed by n.
MIn Set of dispatchable power plants i located at node n
MJn Set of stochastic power plants j located at node n
MIa Set of dispatchable power plants i located in area a
S Set of stochastic power production scenarios indexed by s
Parameters
W j Expected power production of stochastic power plant j [MW]
Wjs Power production by stochastic power plant j in scenario s [MW]
pis Probability of occurrence of scenario s
A`n Line-to-bus incidence matrix
B` Absolute value of the susceptance of AC line `
Dn Demand at node n [MW]
Ci Energy offer price of power plant i [e/MWh]
C
+/−
i Up/down reserve capacity offer price of power plant i [e/MW]
Csh Value of involuntarily shed load [e/MWh]
Pi Capacity of dispatchable power plant i [MW]
R
+/−
i Up/down reserve capacity offer quantity of power plant i [e/MW]
RR
+/−
a Up/down reserve capacity requirements of area a [MW]
Te/` Transmission capacity of link e/line ` [MW]
Variables
δn Voltage angle at node n at day-ahead stage [rad]
δns Voltage angle at node n in scenario s [rad]
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χe/` Transmission allocation of link e/line `, i.e., percentage of inter-area interconnection capacity
of link e/line ` allocated to reserves exchange
f` Power flow in AC line ` at day-ahead stage [MW]
f`s Power flow in AC line ` in scenario s [MW]
lshns Load shedding at node n in scenario s [MW]
pi Day-ahead schedule of dispatchable power plant i [MW]
p
+/−
is Up/down regulation provided by dispatchable power plant i in scenario s [MW]
r
+/−
e Up/down reserve capacity (‘exported’) from area as(e) to area ar(e) [MW] (equivalently
imported to area ar(e) from area as(e))
wj Day-ahead schedule of stochastic power plant j [MW]
wspilljs Power spilled by stochastic power plant j in scenario s [MW]
ns nr
`1
`2
... `q
· · ·· · ·
... ...
i
i ∈MIas(e)
Area as(e)
H(e, as(e)) = −1
Area ar(e)
H(e, ar(e)) = 1
Link e
Λe = {`1, . . . , `q}
Figure A.9: An illustration of the main notation used for graph (A, E)
Appendix B. Data for two-area example
For this example, we removed area 3 from the example in Section 6.1 while all the other
parameters are kept unchanged. The different levels of wind power penetration are modeled by
changing the installed capacities of the wind power plants j3 and j6. 312 MW corresponds to
120 and 192 MW, respectively. 273 MW corresponds to 105 and 168 MW, whereas 234 MW
corresponds to 90 and 144 MW. Normalization is done by dividing the expected operation cost by
the cost under the same wind power penetration but with χ =  where  > 0 is a small positive
number.
Appendix C. KKT conditions
We provide the complete set of KKT conditions for the reserve and day-ahead markets in (4f)
and (4g), that appear in the lower level of the stochastic bilevel optimization in (4). The dual
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multipliers of inequality constraints are listed to the right of the complementarity relationships
denoted by ⊥. For the equality constraints, the dual multipliers are listed after a colon.
The KKT conditions for the reserve market in (4f) are:
0 ≤ R+i − r+i ⊥ µR
+
i ≥ 0, ∀i,
0 ≤ R−i − r−i ⊥ µR
−
i ≥ 0, ∀i,
0 ≤
∑
i∈MIa
r+i +
∑
e∈E
H(e, a)r+e −RR+a ⊥ µRR
+
a ≥ 0, ∀a,
0 ≤
∑
i∈MIa
r−i +
∑
e∈E
H(e, a)r−e −RR−a ⊥ µRR
−
a ≥ 0, ∀a,
0 ≤ r+e + χ′eTe ⊥ ζL
+
e ≥ 0, ∀e,
0 ≤ χ′eTe − r+e ⊥ ζU
+
e ≥ 0, ∀e,
0 ≤ r−e + χ′eTe ⊥ ζL
−
e ≥ 0, ∀e,
0 ≤ χ′eTe − r−e ⊥ ζU
−
e ≥ 0, ∀e,
0 ≤ C+i + µR
+
i −
∑
a:i∈MIa
µRR
+
a ⊥ r+i ≥ 0, ∀i,
0 ≤ C−i + µR
−
i −
∑
a:i∈MIa
µRR
−
a ⊥ r−i ≥ 0, ∀i,∑
a
µRR
+
a H(e, a) + ζL
+
e − ζU
+
e = 0, ∀e,∑
a
µRR
−
a H(e, a) + ζL
−
e − ζU
−
e = 0, ∀e.
The KKT conditions for the day-ahead market in (4g) are:∑
j∈MJn
wj +
∑
i∈MIn
pi −
∑
`∈LAC
A`nf` = Dn : λn free, ∀n,
0 ≤ pi − r−i ⊥ µPLi ≥ 0, ∀i,
0 ≤ Pi − r+i − pi ⊥ µPUi ≥ 0, ∀i,
0 ≤W j − wj ⊥ µWUj ≥ 0, ∀j,
f` = B`
∑
n∈N
A`nδn : λ
F
` free, ∀`,
0 ≤ f` + (1− χ′`) T` ⊥ ζL` ≥ 0, ∀`,
0 ≤ (1− χ′`) T` − f` ⊥ ζU` ≥ 0, ∀`,
δ1 = 0 : λ
REF free,
Ci +
∑
n:i∈MIn
λn − µPLi + µPUi = 0, ∀i,
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0 ≤
∑
n:j∈MJn
λn + µ
WU
j ⊥ wj ≥ 0, ∀j,∑
n
A`nλn − λF` − ζL` + ζU` = 0, ∀`,∑
`
λF` B`A`n = 0, ∀n 6= 1,∑
`
λF` B`A`n − λREF = 0, n = 1.
Note that the conditions above involve the solutions of the reserve market r+i and r
−
i , and the
transmission allocations χ′ from the optimization variables of preemptive model (4).
Appendix D. Unique properties of the Shapley value
In this section, we analyze each of the unique properties of the Shapley value and how they
relate to the fundamental properties associated with the core and the least-core.
Appendix D.1. Dummy player
Dummy player property requires βa = 0 for all a such that v(C)− v(C \a) = 0 for all C ⊆ A. In
other words, an area incapable of contributing to any coalition C ends up with zero benefits. We
now reiterate Proposition 1 and then prove the two claims.
Proposition 5. For the core and the least-core, we have,
(i) If a′ satisfies v(A)− v(A \ a′) = 0, then KCore(v) ⊂ {β |βa′ = 0},
(ii) If a′ satisfies v(C)− v(C \ a′) = 0 for all C ⊆ A, then KCore(v, ∗(v)) ⊂ {β |βa′ = 0}.
Proof. (i) Assume core is nonempty, since otherwise the proof is trivial. Combining the equality
constraint with the inequality constraint corresponding toA\a′, we obtain βa′ ≤ v(A)−v(A\a′) = 0
for any β ∈ KCore(v). Combining this with KCore(v) ⊂ RA+ gives us βa′ = 0 for any β ∈ KCore(v).
(ii) Assume core is empty, ∗(v) > 0, since otherwise part (i) concludes that KCore(v, ∗(v)) ⊆
KCore(v) ⊂ {β |βa′ = 0}. Next, we prove by contradiction that first βa′ > 0 is not possible and
then βa′ < 0 is not possible.
Let βˆ ∈ KCore(v, ∗(v)) be a benefit allocation with βˆa′ > 0. We now show that there exists
 < ∗(v) such that KCore(v, ) 6= ∅. This would contradict the definition of the least-core.
For any C 3 a′, we have ∑a∈C βˆa >∑a∈C\a′ βˆa ≥ v(C \ a′)− ∗(v) = v(C)− ∗(v). Notice that
we can always find a small positive number δ such that
∑
a∈C βˆa − (|A| − |C|)δ > v(C)− ∗(v) + δ
holds for any C 3 a′. Next, we show that KCore(v, ∗(v)− δ) is nonempty for this particular choice.
Define β¯ such that β¯a = βˆa + δ for all a 6= a′and β¯a′ = βˆa′ − (|A| − 1)δ. This new allocation
β¯ clearly satisfies the equality constraint in KCore(v, 
∗(v) − δ). For inequality constraints C 3 a′,
we have
∑
a∈C β¯a =
∑
a∈C βˆa − (|A| − |C|)δ > v(C) − ∗(v) + δ, where the strict inequality follows
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from the definition of δ. For inequality constraints C 63 a′, we have ∑a∈C β¯a ≥ ∑a∈C βˆa + δ ≥
v(C) − ∗(v) + δ. Hence, β¯ ∈ KCore(v, ∗(v) − δ), in other words, KCore(v, ∗(v) − δ) 6= ∅. This
contradicts KCore(v, 
∗(v)) being the least-core. Hence, βˆa′ 6> 0.
Next, let βˆ ∈ KCore(v, ∗(v)) be a benefit allocation with βˆa′ < 0. We again show that there
exists  < ∗(v) such that KCore(v, ) 6= ∅.
Since βˆ ∈ KCore(v, ∗(v)) and v(a′) = 0, we have 0 > βa′ ≥ v(a′) − ∗(v) = −∗(v). Notice
that, for any C 63 a′, we have ∑a∈C βˆa ≥ v(C ∪ a′)− ∗(v)− βa′ by adding and subtracting βa′ , and
by using the fact that ∗(v) > 0 for the special case corresponding to C ∪ a′ = A. Since we have
v(C ∪ a′) = v(C) and βa′ < 0, we obtain
∑
a∈C βˆa > v(C)− ∗(v). Notice that we can always find a
small positive number δ such that
∑
a∈C βˆa − |C|δ > v(C) − ∗(v) + δ holds for any C 63 a′. Next,
we show that KCore(v, 
∗(v)− δ) is nonempty for this particular choice.
Define β¯ such that β¯a = βˆa − δ for all a 6= a′and β¯a′ = βˆa′ + (|A| − 1)δ. This new allocation
β¯ clearly satisfies the equality constraint in KCore(v, 
∗(v) − δ). For inequality constraints C 63 a′,
we have
∑
a∈C β¯a =
∑
a∈C βˆa − |C|δ > v(C) − ∗(v) + δ, where the strict inequality follows from
the definition of δ. For inequality constraints C 3 a′, we have ∑a∈C β¯a ≥ ∑a∈C βˆa + δ ≥ v(C) −
∗(v) + δ. Hence, β¯ ∈ KCore(v, ∗(v)− δ), in other words, KCore(v, ∗(v)− δ) 6= ∅. This contradicts
KCore(v, 
∗(v)) being the least-core. Hence, βˆa′ 6< 0. This concludes that βˆa′ = 0. 
The proposition above provides a missing link in the comparisons of the Shapley value, the core,
and the least-core in a generic coalitional game. It shows that the core attains a more restrictive
version of the dummy player property, i.e., βa = 0 for all a such that v(A) − v(A \ a) = 0. In
other words, an area incapable of contributing to the set of all areas A ends up with zero benefits.
Finally, the least-core attains the dummy player property in the same way that it is defined for
the Shapley value.
Appendix D.2. Symmetry
Symmetry property is achieved if the benefit allocations of two areas are the same whenever
their marginal contributions to any coalition C are the same. It can be verified that this property
does not hold for every benefit allocation from the core and the least-core. However, it is always
possible to find a benefit allocation satisfying the symmetry property in any nonempty strong -core
(and hence both in the core and the least-core) since the linear inequality constraints imposed by
the convex polytope KCore(v, ) on two such areas are identical. Notice that the symmetry property
is computationally hard to check since it would require evaluating the function v for all coalitions.
We can instead aim for a more restrictive version of the symmetry property by considering only the
marginal contributions to the set of all areas A. This stronger condition would be computationally
tractable.
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Appendix D.3. Additivity
Additivity property is given by β(vˆ + v) = β(vˆ) + β(v) for all vˆ, v : 2A → R. As it is discussed
in (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994), this property is mathematically convenient but hard to argue
for since the sum of coalitional value functions is in general considered to induce an unrelated
coalitional game. As a remark, additivity further implies that the benefit allocation of any player
responds monotonically to changes in the coalition value v(C) (a positive change if C contains the
area). In the general case, this property cannot be achieved by any benefit allocation chosen from
both the core and the least-core, see the discussions and the counter examples in (Young, 1985).
Appendix E. Definitions and discussions for the nucleolus allocation
In this section, we provide the mathematical definition for the nucleolus allocation, compare
it with the Shapley value, and discuss additional aspects of its computation and lexicographic
minimization property.
Denote the excesses as θ(v, β, C) = v(C) −∑a∈C βa for any nonempty C ⊂ A. Let θ(v, β) ∈
R2|A|−2 be the vector whose entries are the excesses but arranged in a nonincreasing order. Given
two such ordered vectors x, y ∈ Rn0 , with x <L y we mean that x is lexicographically smaller than
y, i.e., there exists an index ν0 ≤ n0 such that xν = yν for all ν < ν0, and xν0 < yν0 . Let X ⊂ RA
denote a set of benefit allocations that we are interested in. Then, the nucleolus of the set X is
the benefit allocation that minimizes the excess of all coalitions in a lexicographic manner among
all benefit allocations from the set X. Specifically, the nucleolus of the set X, βNuc(v,X) ∈ X, is
defined by
θ(v, βNuc(v,X)) <L θ(v, βˆ), ∀βˆ ∈ X s.t. βˆ 6= βNuc(v,X).
In the literature, the nucleolus is generally defined with respect to two sets. Let XBB = {β ∈
RA|∑a∈A βa = v(A)} be the set of all efficient benefit allocations. The nucleolus of the set XBB,
βNuc(v,XBB), was introduced in Sobolev (1975), and is also called the prenucleolus. This allocation
always exists for any coalitional game, and it is unique. Moreover, it lies in the least-core since
its definition can be regarded as a stronger version of minimizing the maximum excess among
all efficient benefit allocations (Maschler et al., 1979). Hence, it satisfies efficiency, approximate
stability and approximate individual rationality.
On the other hand, let XBB,IR = {β ∈ RA+|
∑
a∈A βa = v(A)} be the set of all efficient and
individually rational benefit allocations. The nucleolus of the set XBB,IR, βNuc(v,XBB,IR), was
introduced in (Schmeidler, 1969). This allocation is again unique, but it exists if and only if
v(A) ≥ 0. It is guaranteed to lie in the least-core only when the coalitional value function v is
nondecreasing, since then it was proven that this allocation coincides with βNuc(v,XBB) (Aumann
& Maschler, 1985).
In comparison with the Shapley value, both nucleolus allocations above are consistent with the
symmetry property but they do not satisfy the additivity property in general, see (Maschler et al.,
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1979). For the special class of convex graph games, these two nucleolus allocations coincide with
the Shapley value (Deng & Papadimitriou, 1994). For our work, the nucleolus will refer to the
nucleolus of the set XBB, since this allocation always exists for a general coalitional game, and it
is always a unique allocation from the least-core.
In terms of computational approaches, note that there are also methods to compute the nu-
cleolus by solving a single linear program involving either 4|A| constraints (Owen, 1974) or 2|A|!
constraints (Kohlberg, 1972). To the best of our knowledge, there are no iterative approaches appli-
cable, and these two methods necessitate the complete evaluation of the coalitional value function.
Finally, as discussed in (Maschler et al., 1992), the lexicographic minimization property attained
by the nucleolus allocation may not be relevant to the needs of every application, and it may even
be considered hard to grasp in some cases. There could be more intuitively acceptable properties
that yield a unique point. For instance, a prominent example is the work by Young et al. (1982)
suggesting to allocate benefits in a water supply project in proportion to the population and the
total demand of an area.
Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 2
Define βˆ ∈ RA such that βˆa′ = v¯(A), and βˆa = 0 for all a 6= a′. We prove by showing that this
allocation lies in the core KCore(v¯). The equality constraint in KCore(v¯) is satisfied by definition.
Notice that the condition given in the proposition, v¯(A \ a′) = 0, implies that v¯(C \ a′) = 0 for all
C ⊂ A. Using this, inequality constraints are divided into two sets of constraints as∑a∈C βˆa ≥ v¯(C),
for all C 3 a′, and ∑a∈C βˆa ≥ 0, for all C 63 a′. The first set of inequalities are satisfied, since
v¯(A) ≥ v¯(C), for all C 3 a′. The second set of inequalities are satisfied, since βˆ ∈ RA+. This
concludes that βˆ ∈ KCore(v¯), and hence the core is nonempty. 
According to the proof above, an area that satisfies the condition in Proposition 2 has a right to
veto any coalitional deviation that does not include it. The proof constructs the benefit allocation
that assigns all the expected cost reduction to this area and then shows that the remaining areas
do not have any incentives to form coalitions.
Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 3
For this proof, we extend the method in (Maschler et al., 1979, Theorem 2.7) by taking into
account that our coalitional value function is defined by v¯(C) = J(∅)−J(C) ≥ 0, for all C ⊂ A. We
prove by contradiction. Let βˆ ∈ KCore(v¯, ∗(v¯)) be a benefit allocation with βˆa′ < 0. In this case,
we show that there exists  < ∗(v¯) such that KCore(v¯, ) 6= ∅. This would contradict the definition
of the least-core.
Since βˆ ∈ KCore(v¯, ∗(v¯)) and v¯(a′) = J(∅)−J(a′) = 0, we have 0 > βa′ ≥ v¯(a′)−∗(v¯) = −∗(v¯).
Notice that, for any C 63 a′, we have ∑a∈C βˆa ≥ v¯(C ∪ a′)− ∗(v¯)− βa′ by adding and subtracting
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βa′ , and by using the fact that 
∗(v¯) > 0 for the case corresponding to C ∪ a′ = A. Since v¯ is
nondecreasing and βa′ < 0, we obtain
∑
a∈C βˆa > v¯(C)− ∗(v¯).
Notice that we can always find a small positive number δ such that
∑
a∈C βˆa − |C|δ > v¯(C) −
∗(v¯) + δ holds for any C 63 a′. Next, we show that KCore(v¯, ∗(v¯) − δ) is nonempty for this
particular choice. Define β¯ such that β¯a = βˆa− δ for all a 6= a′and β¯a′ = βˆa′ + (|A|− 1)δ. This new
allocation β¯ clearly satisfies the equality constraint in KCore(v¯, 
∗(v¯)−δ). For inequality constraints
C 63 a′, we have ∑a∈C β¯a = ∑a∈C βˆa − |C|δ > v¯(C) − ∗(v¯) + δ, where the strict inequality follows
from the definition of δ. For inequality constraints C 3 a′, we have ∑a∈C β¯a ≥ ∑a∈C βˆa + δ ≥
v¯(C) − ∗(v¯) + δ. Hence, β¯ ∈ KCore(v¯, ∗(v¯) − δ), in other words, KCore(v¯, ∗(v¯) − δ) 6= ∅. This
contradicts KCore(v¯, 
∗(v¯)) being the least-core. 
Appendix H. MILP reformulation of problem (9) and the constraint generation al-
gorithm
Since we have v¯(C) = J(∅)− J(C), optimal solutions to problem (9) coincide with the ones to
the following problem:
minimize
C⊆A
J(C) +
∑
a∈C
βka . (H.1)
The problem above is given by the following MILP:
J¯(βk) = minimize
ΦkPR
∑
i∈I
(
C+i r
+
i + C
−
i r
−
i
)
+
∑
i∈I
Cipi
+
∑
s∈S
pis
[∑
i∈I
Ci
(
p+is − p−is
)
+
∑
n∈N
Cshlshns
]
+
∑
a∈C
baβ
k
a (H.2a)
subject to
ba ∈ {0, 1}, ∀a ∈ A, (H.2b)
(1− bar(e))χe ≤ χ′e ≤ (1− bar(e))χe + bar(e) and
(1− bas(e))χe ≤ χ′e ≤ (1− bas(e))χe + bas(e),∀e ∈ E , (H.2c)
Constraints (3b)− (3f) and (3h), ∀s ∈ S, (H.2d)
− bar(`)M ≤ f`s − f` ≤ bar(`)M and
− bas(`)M ≤ f`s − f` ≤ bas(`)M,
∀` ∈ ∪e∈E(χ)Λe, ∀s ∈ S, (H.2e)
Constraints (4f) and (4g). (H.2f)
39
where M is a large positive number, ΦkPR = {ba, ∀a∪χ′e,∀e∪ΦR∪ΦD∪ΦsB,∀s} is the set of primal
optimization variables. For the sake of brevity, the KKT conditions and the Lagrange multipliers
of the lower-level optimization problems are omitted, see Appendix C.
In problem (H.2), the parameter βka can be considered as the activation fee of area a for
participating in the preemptive model. Given such activation fees, problem (H.2) then finds the
optimal set of participants for the preemptive model. Notice that this problem involves |A| more
binary variables than problem (4). In Section 6.2, the numerical case studies illustrate that the
computation times are still similar for both problems. Let {bˆa,∀a} denote the optimal binary
solution. Finally, we have Ck = {a ∈ A | bˆa = 1} and v¯(Ck) = J(∅)− (J¯(βk)−
∑
a∈Ck β
k
a).
We can summarize this iterative algorithm as follows.
Algorithm 1 Constraint Generation Algorithm for the Least-Core Selecting Mechanism
Initialize: Compute v¯(A), and βc, set k = 0, η0 = 1, 0 = 0, initialize F1 (e.g., F1 = ∅).
1: while ηk > k do
2: k ← k + 1
3: Obtain k and βk by solving (7) and (8), and obtain ηk, Ck, and v¯(Ck) by solving (9).
4: Set Fk+1 = Fk ∪ Ck.
5: end while and return βk = βˆ(v¯, βc).
Appendix I. Proof of Proposition 4
Assume β ∈ KCore(vs). We now prove that this yields a contradiction. Notice that KCore(vs) ⊂
RA+ since βa ≥ vs(a) = 0. The scenario-specific core also implies∑
a∈A\C
βa ≤ vs(A)− vs(C) < 0.
The inequality above follows from combining
∑
a∈A βa = v
s(A) and∑a∈C βa ≥ vs(C). We obtained
a contradiction. 
Appendix J. Market outcomes for three-area example
The market outcomes for the existing sequential market model and the preemptive model are
provided in Table J.7. For the preemptive model, the values of r− and r+ shown in parenthesis
indicate the amount of reserves destined to meet the requirements of the neighboring areas. Notice
that inflexible generators and wind power generators are not capable of providing any reserves. In
the day-ahead stage, the quantities correspond to pi and wj for conventional units and wind power
generators, respectively. Because of the null production costs, wind power generators are always
utilized at their full capacity given by the expected value of the stochastic process. In the balancing
stage, the quantities correspond to the changes in the production levels with respect to the ones
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assigned at the day-ahead stage. Specifically, they are given by (p+is − p−is) and (Wjs − wj − wspilljs )
for conventional units and wind power generators, respectively. It can be verified that there is 31
MW and 15.6 MW curtailment in the wind power production in the existing market model for
scenarios s1 and s2. This is completely eliminated when the preemptive model is used.
Observe that the implementation of the preemptive model results in a higher reserve allocation
for the lower cost generator at node 8. Consequently, the day-ahead market takes these new reserve
quantities into account while deciding on the day-ahead energy quantities. Notice that there is 9
MW load shedding in scenario s2 in the existing market model. The preemptive model ensures
that we do not resort to any costly load shedding in both scenarios.
Table J.7: Market outcomes for the existing sequential market and the preemptive model (in MW)
Models Existing market model Preemptive model
Trading floors Reserve Day-ahead Balancing Reserve Day-ahead Balancing
r− r+ s1 s2 r− r+ s1 s2
i1 0 0 120 0 0 0 0 120 0 0
i2 8 12 38 3 3 8 12 38 7.7 7.2
i3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i4 0 0 120 0 0 0 0 120 0 0
i5 9.6 6.4 33 6 6 7.2 4 31.1 −7.2 −7.2
i6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i7 0 0 120 0 0 0 0 120 0 0
i8 8 12 38 12 12 10.4 (2.4) 14.4 (2.4) 35.6 −10.1 14.4
i9 0 0 6.6 0 0 0 0 10.9 0 0
j3 0 0 42 −3 −12 0 0 42 8 −12
j6 0 0 70.4 −6.4 −6 0 0 70.4 −6.4 9.6
j9 0 0 42 −12 −12 0 0 42 8 −12
In Table J.8, we provide the consumer and producer surpluses (CS and PS), and the congestion
rents (CR) allocated to each area under both scenarios in the existing sequential market. Using
these allocations for all trading floors, we defined a budget balanced cost allocation in the numerical
case studies.
Appendix K. Impact of the network topology on benefit allocations in the three-area
example
In this example, our goal is to illustrate how the network topology and the specific location
of each area in the electricity network affects the benefits allocated to this area. To this end,
we modify our base model by removing the wind generator from area 2 and by changing all the
units in area 2 to be inflexible. Benefit allocations for the expected cost reduction are provided in
Figure K.10. We highlight that removing a zero marginal cost wind generator increased the costs
globally. In this setup, area 2 receives the highest benefits under every allocation mechanism, even
though this area is not capable of directly participating in any reserve exchange. Nevertheless,
the role of area 2 in this network arrangement is instrumental, since it enables the coordination
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Table J.8: Cost allocations in all trading floors for the existing sequential market (in e)
Areas Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
CS for (1) −60.0 −64.0 −70.0
PS for (1) 0 0 0
CR for (1) 0 0 0
CS for (2) −8,448.0 −7,239.0 −9,900.0
PS for (2) 4,159.6 3,750.2 4,392.0
CR for (2) 0 99.0 99.0
CS for (3) in s1 0 0 0
PS for (3) in s1 0 −6,400.0 5,250.0
CR for (3) in s1 0 0 0
CS for (3) in s2 0 0 0
PS for (3) in s2 −12,000.0 0 2,250.0
CR for (3) in s2 0 0 0
Js1a (∅) 4,348.4 9,853.8 229.0
Js2a (∅) 16,348.4 3,453.8 3,229.0
between areas 1 and 3 because of its location in the area graph.
Figure K.10: Benefit allocations after removing the flexibility and the uncertainty from area 2 (in e)
As a remark, the core is nonempty, since the condition in Proposition 2 is satisfied. The Shapley
value is also in the core, since we verified that the coalition value function is supermodular.
Appendix L. IEEE RTS layout
The layout can be found in Figure L.11. The area graph is illustrated in Figure L.12.
Appendix M. Modifications of IEEE RTS case study
Appendix M.1. Impact of the wind power penetration levels on benefit allocations
The wind power penetration level of an area is defined as the ratio between the expected wind
power production and the total demand of that area. In this example, we change the level of
wind power penetration for area 1. The default value is given by 30% from the previous section.
The resulting benefits allocations for area 1 are provided in Figure M.13. For all efficient benefit
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Figure L.11: IEEE 48-node RTS layout with six areas
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Link Capacity
Te1 1,900MW
Te2 200MW
Te3 500MW
Te4 200MW
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Te6 1,900MW
Te7 700MW
Figure L.12: The area graph for the IEEE RTS
allocation mechanisms, observe that the benefits initially increase and then decrease with the wind
power penetration level. It is generally hard to anticipate such changes in the benefits, since the
wind power generation has two impacts acting in opposite directions. On the one hand, it has null
production cost bringing in low cost energy to the coalition. On the other hand, it increases the
need for the reserve and balancing services. As a remark, in this study, the core is empty for the
levels 15% and 22.5%.
Figure M.13: Benefit allocations of area 1 for the different levels of wind power penetration in area 1 (in e)
Appendix M.2. Impact of the available flexibility on benefit allocations
In order to assess the impact of available flexibility, we double the capacities of all flexible
generators in area 4. The changes in the benefits allocations are provided in Figure M.14, denoted
by ∆β. The figure shows that the benefits allocated to area 4 are increased under every allocation
mechanism compared to Figure 7. All mechanisms account for the flexibility offered by the gen-
erators in area 4 both in the reserve capacity and the balancing markets. Note that an increase
in the capacity of flexible generators reduces also the day-ahead system cost both with or without
the implementation of the preemptive model. Finally, predicting the changes in the benefits of the
other areas is quite difficult. We observe that this additional flexibility replaced the flexibility in
areas 1 and 2, while increasing the contributions of areas 3 and 5 in subcoalitions.
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Figure M.14: The changes in benefit allocations after increasing the flexibility in area 4 (in e)
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